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Abstract
The topic of this article is the formal topology abstracted from the Zariski spectrum of a
commutative ring. After recollecting the fundamental concepts of a basic open and a covering
relation, we study some candidates for positivity. In particular, we present a coinductively generated
positivity relation. We further show that, constructively, the formal Zariski topology cannot have
enough points.
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1. Introduction
The prime spectrum of a commutative ring is a space whose points are the prime ideals
of this ring. Rooted in the 19th century German school of what today is called algebraic
number theory, the concept of a prime ideal is literally of idealistic origin. To achieve the
uniqueness of prime factorisation—which is folklore for the rational integers—also for the
ring of integral elements of an arbitrary algebraic number field, Kummer imaginarily ex-
tended any such ring by ‘ideal numbers’ that allow for a unique factorisation as products of
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‘ideal prime numbers’. This idea was then realised by Dedekind, who introduced the ideal
(prime) numbers just as the (prime) ideals of those rings of integers [42, Ch. 1, Section 3].
Prime ideals are typical points inasmuch as many of them—more specifically, certain
maximal polynomial ideals1—can be viewed as that which has been made out of the points
in geometry during the algebraisation process that Descartes started with representing
points by coordinates. One may thus interpret the concept of a prime ideal as a late
successor of Euclid’s likewise idealistic definition of a point as an object with no parts
or, in modern terms, with no extension.
To estimate properly the major role played by the prime spectra of commutative rings,
one should take into account that each scheme—the modern adaptation of the classic
notion of an algebraic variety lying right at the basis of algebraic geometry—can be
covered by open subschemes each of which is an affine scheme: that is, isomorphic to a
prime spectrum. This property, moreover, is characteristic of schemes, just as being locally
homeomorphic to an open subset of a Euclidean space is characteristic of differentiable
manifolds.
Algebraic geometry as summarised in [25] was given its current form in the second
half of the 20th century, mainly by the French group around Grothendieck and Serre.
They departed from the work of Chow, Weil, Zariski, and others, who translated the vivid
achievements of the Italian school of geometers (Castelnuovo, Enriques, Severi, et al.) to
the language of modern algebra. This was started in the meantime by Hilbert, Krull, Emmy
Noether, and their followers—and evolved around the concept of an ideal.
As today’s algebraic geometry has led to a proof of Fermat’s conjecture, its power is
beyond doubt. The concept of a scheme allows for using geometric methods in algebraic
number theory, whereas the previous notion of a variety was too narrow for such purposes.2
The price one has to pay for the strength of contemporary algebraic geometry is, in
addition to the relatively high degree of abstractness, its nonconstructive and impredicative
character, which to some extent originates in the idealistic nature of prime ideals.
Besides causing reservations from a foundational perspective, this drawback has yet
prevented algebraic geometry from any wholesale formulation in a mathematical theory
that is more akin to a high-level programming language than it is the traditional one.
Now, however, the time seems ripe for re-approaching this area in such a way that the
requirements of those theories are met as perfectly as possible.
By beginning such an approach, we want to prepare that field for the eventual computer-
assisted treatment by means of appropriate proof-developing systems. To mention only a
few of them (in alphabetical order), there are Agda/Alf(a), Coq, Isabelle, Lego, Minlog,
and Nuprl, of which the first is allegedly best suited for handling formal topology: it is
explicitly based on predicative Martin-Löf type theory, and the formalisation of proofs
from formal topology has already begun [13,11].
In contrast to computational algebraic geometry based on the concept of a Gröbner
basis (see, for example, [17]), the object of our undertaking is to provide a universal
1 For more details, see Footnote 7.
2 See [42, Ch. 1, Section 13, Section 14] for a fairly elementary explanation why the theory of schemes is the
canonical transit area between number theory and algebraic geometry.
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formalisation, as close as possible to the received setting, which not only facilitates
machine-supported reasoning but also the extraction of programs from proofs. We aim
at theorems whose proofs can be checked by routines within the theory, so that every
program taken from a formalised proof is provably correct: the original proof serves also
as a correctness proof.
Rather than developing a separate algorithm for each existence theorem, we want to
modify the given theory so that the essence of the program is already present in the proof.
Although safety has then priority over feasibility, nothing hinders one from carefully tuning
the algorithms later. In this context, one also ought to take into account that secure software
has become a more relevant issue, and that developing programs by ad hoc means might
later be regarded as a waste of human resources.
In addition to dispensing with termination proofs that make use of metatheoretical
suppositions such as the validity of proofs by contradiction, we avoid any assumption that
might conflict with a computational model, or even with an actual implementation, of the
algebraic structures under consideration. In particular, we do not assume the decidability of
equality, let alone the stronger one of subset membership. Our motivation for not assuming
even the former is that we want to cope equally with algebraic geometry over the real or
complex numbers, rather than unnecessarily restricting our attention to the case of discrete
base fields.
In algorithmic algebraic number theory, on the other hand, it is legitimate to assume ‘that
there is a clear-cut answer whether a is equal to b or whether a, b are distinct’ [45, p. 6];
indeed, this provably holds for algebraic numbers [38, Theorem VI.1.9]. To decide which
alternative holds in a specific instance may nonetheless require considerable computational
efforts; whence one better avoids building one’s theory upon assumptions like this.3
It is anyway little clear whether one may suppose the decidability of the membership of
the ideal I of Z that is generated by the perfect numbers: as 1 belongs to this ideal if and
only if there exists an odd perfect number, any such decidability assumption would lead
to a too simple solution of the open problem of whether there actually is an odd perfect
number. In particular, we cannot say yet whether 1 = 0 in the quotient ring Z/I .
By following the lines of Bishop-style constructive algebra [6,38], we expect to end up
with a theory that is suited as the core of all more technical settings, just as constructive
analysis serves for a theoretical basis of computational and recursive analysis [7,5]. A
further feature of our approach is that the geometry is kept closer to the underlying
algebra; whence a widespread attitude will once more be disproved: that any attempt to
avoid the putative short cuts somewhat peculiar to classical mathematics—which in effect
often destroy some of the information contained in the initial data—inevitably involves
unwelcome complexity.
Enough evidence of the practicability of this project is already provided by an alternative
treatment of the Zariski topology on the prime spectrum of a commutative ring with unit.
This attempt requires us to regard points—that is, in this case, prime ideals—as truly ideal
entities, a strategy which is one of the characteristics of formal topology. We therefore
decided to work within this theory, which was put forward in the mid 1980s by Giovanni
3 We owe this argument to Jesper Carlström.
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Sambin [47] in order to make available to Martin-Löf type theory [36] the concepts of
classical topology that are worth keeping to such a constructive and predicative framework.
As since raised by, among others, the Padua, Gothenburg, and Uppsala schools of
mathematical logic, formal topology has proved a fairly universal setting for doing
topology in a point-free way; we refer to [49] for a recent and exhaustive overview. It
has successfully been applied in various areas of pure mathematics, symbolic logic, and
theoretical computer science, and simultaneously generalises locale theory and domain
theory [53,48,41].
In return, we supply, as a by-product of our work, a variety of algebraic–geometric
examples suited for the future study of formal topology. Note, moreover, that the concept
of a spectral locale, which is the point-free counterpart of Hochster’s notion of a spectral
space [26], is crucial for non-Hausdorff point-free topology in general, and for its
applications in domain theory in particular [61, Ch. 9]. As being a spectral space means
to possess the characteristic properties of the spectrum of a commutative ring, we even
provide examples of spectral formal topologies in a sense yet to be made precise.
A further task of our studies, which we perform in [55], is to indicate that a concept
of a sheaf on an arbitrary formal topology can be abstracted in a fairly canonical manner
from the formal adaptation of the structure sheaf on the Zariski spectrum. Since Leray and
Henri Cartan introduced the language of sheaves in the years after World War II, it has
clearly been an indispensable tool for geometry, topology, and related disciplines. Later
on, sheaves gave rise to topos theory (see [33] for an introduction), a fairly subtle construct
which is often proposed as a categorical foundation for mathematics.
From a constructive standpoint, topos theory is fine as a foundation in so far as the
natural logic for topos theory is the intuitionistic one,4 and it dispenses with all forms
of the axiom of choice. From a predicative perspective, however, topos theory causes
some worries about its peculiarly unrestricted use of the full power set. More specifically,
set comprehension and related principles are constructively incompatible with choice
principles: in the presence of a sufficiently strong version of either, the law of excluded
middle can be deduced [19,24].
Also Martin-Löf type theory, which as yet includes a fairly general choice principle
[36, pp. 50–2], may get infected with classical logic as soon as one relaxes the regulations
for how to form sets. Rather strong power set and effective quotient constructors were
looked at in this context [34,35]. There is nonetheless a promising avenue to connect
topos theory with type theory: the so-called logic-enriched type theory [1] is an extension
of Martin-Löf type theory which allows us to do without the proposition-as-types
interpretation, and thus without the type-theoretic choice principle.5 Among other things,
our work is intended to complement this approach; perhaps the formal variant of sheaves
we propose in [55] will eventually serve as the starting point of an alternative and perhaps
easier path to topos theory.
4 This is intuitively clear when one takes into account that the open subsets of a topological space usually
form a Heyting algebra rather than a Boolean algebra: the complement of an open set is seldom open, too, and
the pseudo-complement (that is, the interior of the complement) is not a true complement.
5 Milly Maietti and Nicola Gambino explained this to us with patience.
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Since formal topology can now be seen as a more and more independent offspring of
type theory, we may use it as a mathematical theory per se. In particular, we do not follow
every conceptual distinction peculiar to type theory, let alone all its notational conventions,
but are confident that most of them can be imposed without major difficulties as occasion
demands. One could simply say that we are doing formal topology informally.
2. Points versus opens
Grothendieck and others6 solved the representation problem
for each commutative ring A with unit, find a topological space and a sheaf of local
rings on it such that A is the ring of global sections of this sheaf
by equipping the prime spectrum
Spec(A) = {p ⊂ A : p prime ideal of A}
of A with the Zariski topology,7 and this with the so-called structure sheaf. In spite of the
defects this classic solution shows from a critical perspective (see below), it possesses a
considerable constructive content—to be revealed during the course of this article and its
follower [55]—which still allows for a topological representation of commutative rings,
and even for an appropriate adaptation of the well-known universal property of Spec(A) as
a locally ringed space together with that structure sheaf.
At least three features of the Zariski topology on Spec(A) attract our attention. First,
the canonical basis of open subsets
D(a) = {p ∈ Spec(A) : a ∈ A \ p} (a ∈ A)
is a family whose index set coincides with the given ring A. Secondly,
D(1) = Spec(A) ,
6 We refer to [28, p. 222] for a historical overview.
7 Classically speaking (as frequently throughout this footnote), the Zariski topology on Spec(A) is given by
prescribing its closed subsets as those of the form
Z(a) = {p∈ Spec(A) : a⊂ p}
with abeing an ideal of A. This definition is grounded in the concrete Zariski topology on C n , say, whose closed
subsets are just the algebraic varieties
Z(a) = {z ∈ C n : f1(z) = . . . = fm(z) = 0
}
.
Here a is an ideal of A = C [X1, . . . , Xn ], which, by the Hilbert basis theorem, is generated by finitely many
polynomials f1, . . . , fm . Needless to say, the Zariski topology on C n is coarser than the norm topology.
By the Hilbert Nullstellensatz, moreover, the maximal ideals of this particular polynomial ring A are just the
ideals that are generated by n monic linear polynomials X1 − z1, . . . , Xn − zn , and thus correspond precisely
to the points (z1, . . . , zn) of C n . In addition to these closed points, Spec(A) contains, among the various other
prime ideals of A, the zero ideal as a dense point—its so-called generic point. As every nonempty open subset of
Spec(A) contains this generic point, Zariski topologies are in general not T1, whereas they are readily seen to be
T0; moreover, they are spectral, and thus sober.
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which is to say that the unit of A is an index for the entire space. Thirdly,
D(ab) = D(a) ∩ D(b)
for all a, b ∈ A; in other words, the intersection of basic open sets corresponds on the
index level to nothing but the multiplication in A.
This situation mirrors the idea underlying formal topology almost as perfectly as if
formal topology was originally tailored for dealing with the Zariski topology (which, of
course, it was not, at least not exclusively, but compare the paradigmatic character of
spectral spaces indicated before). For reasons that will be explained in a moment, it indeed
appears fairly natural to cast the points of Spec(A) in a secondary role, and, moreover,
to take seriously the fact that the indices of the basic open sets—that is, the elements of
A—are the primitive objects.
The essence of formal topology now is to adopt such a shift of perspective as a general
principle. More specifically, the received conceptual precedence of points over open sets
is completely reverted, and, secondly, the role of a basis of the topology is played by
any monoid whatsoever, which mostly is supposed to be commutative. In the same way
in which the multiplicative monoid of a commutative ring A represents the basis of the
Zariski topology on Spec(A), in a formal topology the monoid operation stands for the
intersection of the members of the basis, and the unit of the monoid for the entire space.
In general, a basis of a topological space neither is closed under intersection nor includes
the whole space. Likewise, the concept of a formal topology as based on a monoid—or,
more specifically, on a meet-semilattice [47]—does not serve for all purposes; whence
today formal topology usually comes without monoid structure [49]. In the present context
of formal Zariski topology we may stick to the former setting, with a multiplicative
operation on the basis being given, and mention the latter approach only in passing.
The elements of the monoid of a formal topology are called basic opens, just because
they are thought to represent the basic open sets, whereas the concept of an arbitrary open
set is substituted by that of an arbitrary open. The latter means a subset8 of the given
monoid, which is intended to stand for the union of all the basic open sets whose indices
are elements of this subset—and therefore indeed represents an arbitrary open set. In this
vein, one uses the letters U, V , W, . . ., which traditionally stand for open subsets, to denote
arbitrary opens, whereas a, b, c, . . . are chosen as symbols for basic opens.
The notion of a formal point enters the stage of formal topology only, if at all, in a
late act, as a subset of the monoid that behaves as if it would consist of the indices of a
neighbourhood filter of an imagined point. Every topological space in the usual sense, with
an underlying set of points, gives rise to a formal topology, and each of its points defines a
formal point. What, however, is wrong with starting from points?
On the one hand, the concept of a point looks vague, if not void, from the constructive
standpoint, and this particularly applies to the case of the Zariski spectrum. So the classical
8 We thus deviate from some of the literature on formal topology where an arbitrary subset of the monoid is
already called a formal open, and reserve this notion for subsets that are saturated with respect to the covering.
The wider use of this term is in compliance with tacitly identifying any subset with its saturation, a strategy
which we do not follow either. We also refer to [43] for an extension of Martin-Löf type theory with a concept of
a subset, and to [52,10] for interpretations of subsets within type theory.
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notion of a prime ideal is constructively too restrictive: in general, one may hardly find any
point in Spec(A). For instance, not even the zero ideal in the sufficiently concrete fields
of real or complex numbers can constructively be thought of as a prime ideal, as we shall
recall in Section 3.
In the presence of the axiom of dependent choices, the existence of a maximal or prime
ideal in a nontrivial countable ring is equivalent to LPO and LLPO, respectively [31],
which are fragments of the law of the excluded middle (see Section 3). The existence
of a maximal or prime ideal in an arbitrary nontrivial commutative ring is equivalent—
at least classically—to the full axiom of choice or the Boolean ultrafilter theorem,
respectively (see [2] for an overview).9 Accordingly, the Zariski spectrum may fail to have
enough points within a general topos which lacks the appropriate variant of the axiom
of choice [27, p. 258], of which there are plenty. As Zorn’s lemma is traditionally used
for ‘constructing’ a maximal ideal in a nontrivial ring, it should be clear that any such
‘construction’ is not a construction in the true sense of the word, but rather postulates the
existence of an ideal object on the mere grounds of an actually given coherent method to
approximate it by real objects.10
The more or less doubtful ontological status of prime ideals is of particular relevance
when one wishes to employ one of the local–global principles, frequently occurring in
commutative algebra and algebraic geometry, by which a certain ‘global’ property (of a
ring, module, homomorphism, etc.) is reduced to the whole of ‘local’ versions of this
property that are achieved by localising the objects under consideration at every prime ideal
of the underlying ring. In any such way, one risks accepting the conjunction of a family
indexed by a possibly empty set as a defining or sufficient condition for the property in
question, no matter whether the latter really is a tautology.
With sheaves of local rings together with the appropriate concept of morphisms between
locally ringed spaces, we encounter in [55] a few characteristic examples for defining
a property by passing from the local to the global. However, we also see in [55] how
to handle these definitions in a truly local, point-free manner—the traditional method,
involving prime ideals, may better be called ‘pointwise’ rather than ‘local’ anyway. We
further refer to [32] for constructive local–global principles neither involving prime nor
maximal ideals but still suited for proving such famous theorems as the ones of Horrocks
and Quillen–Suslin, and the Serre conjecture.
Anybody with a certain knowledge of intuitionistic algebra [46,59], locale theory
[28, V.3.2], or topos theory [39,58]11 might argue that the notion of a prime ideal should
9 From a classical perspective, one might argue that most rings occurring in algebraic geometry, say, are finitely
generated algebras over a field (that is, quotient rings of polynomial rings in finitely many variables) and thus, by
Hilbert’s basis theorem, satisfy the ascending chain condition for ideals; whence the existence of a maximal ideal
in every nontrivial ring of this kind can be proved without invoking the axiom of choice. This argument, however,
works only classically, because constructively one can at most expect that, in a finitely generated algebra over
a discrete field, in each ascending chain of ideals two successive elements coincide, rather than all but finitely
many of them. For a more detailed discussion thereof see [38, VIII.1]; we wish to thank Fred Richman who has
reminded us thereof.
10 There is some evidence for that a certain understanding of Zorn’s lemma is more harmless than the axiom of
choice [4], but this understanding hardly suffices for ‘constructing’ maximal ideals in general.
11 We are grateful to Steve Vickers for these references.
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anyway be replaced by that which is synonymously known as a prime coideal, prime
anti-ideal, or prime filter. This positively describes the properties characteristic of the
complement of a prime ideal, and ‘because it is at these objects that we wish to localize,
and since ¬¬ = id, we must deal with them directly’ [58, p. 194]. Indeed, the real
or complex numbers different from zero form a prime filter; more generally, so do the
invertible elements of every nontrivial local ring.
All their virtues notwithstanding, prime filters are not really an alternative: except for
the aforementioned and a few other relatively simple cases (see [46] and [59, Ch. 8]), they
seem to be even harder to grasp than prime ideals. As for the latter, there appears to be
no universal existence proof for the former that can do without any principle related to the
axiom of choice, and up to now the intention of effectively presenting coideals reduces this
concept to that of a complement of a finitely generated or even principal ideal.
Besides, the prime filters of a commutative ring A turn out to be the formal points of
the formal Zariski topology of A, with their truly idealistic character. As shown in [55],
one even cannot expect to prove constructively that the formal Zariski topology of an
arbitrary discrete ring has enough (formal) points in a sense analogous to the one of locale
theory [20].12 Since, however, coideals in general will play a central role in the subsequent
development of our theory, we shall undertake a successful attempt to coinductively
generate a family of coideals that is essential for completing the so-called basic picture
of Zariski topology (Section 6.1).
On the other hand, the open sets of a topological space are usually formed as collections
of elements of the underlying set, by invoking principles of classical set theory which
may already cause foundational doubts. In any such case, moreover, every quantification
over open sets necessarily involves a possibly impredicative second-order quantification:
namely, over subsets of the set underlying the topological space. To establish open subsets
of Spec(A), by gathering prime ideals together, is even of third order: it means to form sets
of subsets of the given set, the ring A—every point of Spec(A) is, as a prime ideal of A,
already a subset of A. Note that literally the same objections apply to prime filters in the
place of prime ideals.
Due to the idealistic character of points, it is also no wonder that points must form a
higher-order concept; this is already clear from the necessarily infinitary definition of a
point on the real line. As various nontrivial topological spaces, the Zariski spectrum may
thus have not enough as well as too many points, no matter whether one takes prime ideals
or prime filters as such. Moreover, a conjunction of an infinite family of conditions is partic-
ularly hard to verify by finite means when it is indexed by entities of a higher-order charac-
ter, as it is the case for the local–global principles mentioned before in their classical form.
Most of these reservations disappear as soon as one decides to work within the setting
of formal topology, where the characteristic of points as ideal objects is taken seriously: the
real objects are the indices of the basic open sets, and a formal point is literally a collection
of objects each of which could count as a coherent approximation to an imagined concrete
point—that is, to one of the ideal objects. Instead of quantifying over all the open sets,
moreover, one then adopts as a rule that it usually suffices to quantify only over the basic
12 Nicola Gambino has kindly pointed out this concept to us.
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open sets, and that one can equally do so with their indices: the elements of the given
monoid. Needless to say, one thus also meets Ockham’s request for the greatest possible
conceptual simplicity, at least in cases like the present one in which the indices are much
more primitive than the basic open subsets.
The monoid under consideration has, of course, to be granted as a set over whose whole
one can legitimately expect complete control. In this vein, we presume throughout that the
commutative ring A we deal with behaves well in all relevant respects, a demand which,
of course, has to be made precise when required. By focusing on the elements of A as
the indices of the basic opens, one also keeps as close as possible to the given data—
which, in our example, include the algebraic structure of the commutative ring A. Hence
one automatically preserves most of the information contained in these data, and avoids
stepping beyond their logical and computational complexity, whereas different point-free
approaches to topology fall short of such expectations, at least from our perspective.
For instance, to establish the Zariski spectrum of A as a locale (see [28, V.3] and [61,
12.2]) one starts with the distributive lattice that is generated by the expressions of the form
D(a) and equipped with the following relations:
D(1) = 1, D(ab) = D(a) ∧ D(b),
D(0) = 0 , D(a + b) ≤ D(a) ∨ D(b). (1)
This so-called reticulation L(A) of A à la Joyal [30] and Simmons [57] is isomorphic to
the distributive lattice of the radicals of finitely generated ideals [14] in the same way in
which the ideal completion of L(A) is isomorphic to the coherent frame of all the radical
ideals of A [28, V.3.2]. As in [14] the former is called the Zariski lattice of A, we may
aptly call the latter the Zariski frame of A. Note also that the Zariski lattice is nothing but
the lattice of compact elements of the Zariski frame.
Apart from perhaps being somewhat unpalatable to some people,13 any talk of lattices
and related concepts (frames, locales, quantales, etc.) looks secondary in the present
context, if not somewhat redundant. Formal topology, on the other hand, allows one to do
without that language—unless and until one wishes to link the former with areas expressed
within the latter. This is best illustrated by the fact that the category of formal topologies
becomes equivalent to that of frames as soon as one allows impredicative reasoning [47];
whence a predicative notion of a frame is ‘nothing but the notion of a formal topology’ [49].
Besides having led to a fairly universal treatment of several lattice-theoretic
disciplines [3], formal topology appears to us as a refinement thereof in many respects.
We even hold that this particularly applies to the case of the Zariski spectrum, although
in [14] the Zariski lattice is said ‘to contain all the informations necessary for a constructive
development of the abstract theory of the Zariski spectrum’. By passing to radical ideals,
namely, one partially loses the multiplicative structure of A, whereas this is completely
maintained in the formal Zariski topology.
For the same reason we neither follow [56], where a definition of the Zariski spectrum
as a formal space begins with identifying each element of A with all its powers, nor the
construction of the corresponding meet-semilattice in [28, V.3.1]. Any such turn would
13 Comprising the author until he has recently learned better.
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only make sense as long as one concentrates on the derived topology of the Zariski
spectrum, and allows oneself to neglect the original character of A as a commutative ring.
We hesitate to subscribe to this strategy, but have to admit that also in the case of the
formal Zariski topology we apparently need to keep extant the additive structure of A,
which goal is achieved without any extra effort as a by-product of introducing the structure
sheaf also in the formal context [55]. This sheaf of local rings transports the ring structure
of A as a whole, and has to adjoin the formal Zariski topology anyway in order to arrive at
the universal property thereof [55].
Last but not least, our way to the formal Zariski topology of A is an elementary short
cut of the following road. First, by inverting the Scott entailment relation  on A from [12],
one again gets an entailment relation 	 on A; see also [14]. Next, there is the distributive
lattice assigned to 	 in the sense of [12], which happens to coincide with L(A). The frame
of ideals of that lattice is then a coherent frame [28, II.3.2]. Finally, the Stone formal
topology associated with this coherent frame [47,40] is just the formal Zariski topology of
A. Also in comparison with this sophisticated approach, the reader may judge our direct
path in the sequel.
3. Rings with inequality
Before entering the context of formal Zariski topology more deeply, we have to collect
some concepts peculiar to commutative algebra or to constructive mathematics, or to
both [38,46,59].
To start with, recall that a set is inhabited if and only if one can present an element of it.
We distinguish this notion from the constructively weaker one of being nonempty, which
only means that the assumption that this set be empty is contradictory.
Following a convenient notation common to formal-topological circles, we say that two
subsets S, T of a fixed set meet each other, for short S  T , whenever their intersection
S ∩ T is inhabited. Note that S  S is equivalent to S being inhabited, and that if S = {s},
then S  T amounts to s ∈ T .
We suppose throughout that 0 is not a natural number; in other words, we set N =
{1, 2, 3, . . .}, and N0 = {0}∪N. We also call a set S finite whenever for some n ∈ N0 there
is a mapping from {1, 2, . . . , n} onto S. Every finite set S of this kind is either empty or
nonempty depending on whether n = 0 or n ∈ N, respectively.14
Every ring A occurring subsequently is assumed to have a unit 1 and to be
commutative.15 As many sets in constructive mathematics, A is to arrive with two binary
relations, an equivalence relation = understood as equality, and a symmetric relation =
intended as inequality which we assume to be consistent with equality in the sense that
14 This use of the term ‘finite set’ differs from that in some literature on constructive mathematics. So in [38] a
finite set is, in addition, required to be discrete (see below), which is to say that its elements are in a one-to-one
correspondence with the numbers 1, . . . , n for some integer n ≥ 0. Finite sets in our weaker sense are then called
‘finitely enumerable’.
15 The attentive reader may excuse that to prepare the noncommutative case we sometimes have chosen a
formulation that appears somewhat redundant in the commutative case.
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¬(a = b ∧ a = b) for all a, b ∈ A. In particular, each of the statements a = b and a = b
implies the negation of the other.
However, we do not suppose from the outset that = be the denial inequality for which
a = b already if ¬(a = b). This interpretation of = as deriving from = is admissible,
but it is only one interpretation; another one is to regard = as a positive concept relatively
independent from = (as for real and complex numbers, see below). Likewise, it is not
generally assumed that = be tight, which is to say that a = b already if ¬(a = b), let alone
that A is discrete—that is, either a = b or else a = b for all a, b ∈ A.
In most cases one nonetheless conceives an inequality to be standard in the sense
of [38]—that is, equivalent to the denial inequality in the presence of classical logic.
Note that in classical mathematics one tacitly presupposes A to be discrete with the denial
inequality. Among the rings naturally occurring in mathematics, some are perfectly discrete
also from the constructive perspective (Z, Q, the field A of algebraic numbers, polynomial
rings over such rings, . . . ), but some are not: R and C do not even come with the denial
inequality (see below).
We expect all ring operations, homomorphisms, relations, predicates, subsets, etc. to be
extensional (that is, to respect equality), but to be strongly extensional (that is, to reflect
inequality) only whenever so declared. For instance, we require every ring homomorphism
ψ : A → B not only to satisfy ψ (1) = 1, but also to be both extensional and strongly
extensional: that is,
a = b =⇒ ψ(a) = ψ(b) and ψ(a) = ψ(b) =⇒ a = b ,
respectively, for all a, b ∈ A.
There sometimes is the need to distinguish two types of a complement of each S ⊂ A,
namely,
∼ S = {a ∈ A : ∀b ∈ S (a = b)} ,
¬ S = {a ∈ A : ∀b ∈ S ¬ (a = b)} .
In particular, ∼ S ⊂ ¬ S because = is consistent, and ∼ S = ¬ S whenever = is the
denial inequality. As the membership relation is extensional according to our conventions,
a ∈ ¬ S precisely when a /∈ S. We also write T ∼ S in place of T ∩ (∼ S), and—as
usual—T \ S in place of T ∩ (¬S).
We use A∗ as a symbol for the set of invertible elements of A, and say that A is trivial
or nontrivial whenever 0 ∈ A∗ or A∗ ⊂∼ {0}, respectively.16 Note that if = is the denial
inequality, then A is nontrivial precisely when it is not trivial.
According to the logical law of ex falso sequitur quodlibet, the denial inequality is
contained in the relative inequality with a = b standing for a = b ⇒ 1 = 0, where 1 and
0 denote the unit and the zero of the ring A. On the other hand, the relative inequality is
consistent with equality if and only if it is contained in the denial inequality, which is the
16 As we do not generally suppose that ab = 0 implies a = 0 and b = 0 (see below), we cannot define a ring
to be nontrivial if just 1 = 0.
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case precisely when ¬(1 = 0)—so, for instance, whenever A is nontrivial. Every ring is
trivially nontrivial with respect to the relative inequality.17
We say that a ring A has recognisable nilpotents whenever
∃n ∈ N (an = 0) ∨ ∀n ∈ N (an = 0)
for each a ∈ A. Classically, of course, every ring has recognisable nilpotents. More
specifically, if = is the denial inequality, then ∀n ∈ N (an = 0) is the negation of
∃n ∈ N (an = 0); whence A has recognisable nilpotents whenever, in addition, one
presupposes an appropriate fragment of the law of excluded middle. When A is even
discrete, then it suffices to assume that the limited principle of omniscience (LPO) be valid,
which says that if (λn)n∈N is an increasing sequence in {0, 1}, then
∃n ∈ N (λn = 1) ∨ ∀n ∈ N (λn = 0) .
LPO implies the weak limited principle of omniscience (WLPO), which says that if
(λn)n∈N is an increasing sequence in {0, 1}, then
¬∀n ∈ N (λn = 0) ∨ ∀n ∈ N (λn = 0).
For every discrete ring A, WLPO implies that A has weakly recognisable nilpotents: that
is,
¬∀n ∈ N (an = 0) ∨ ∀n ∈ N (an = 0)
for each a ∈ A. A consequence of WLPO is the lesser limited principle of omniscience
(LLPO), which says that if (λn)n∈N is a sequence in {0, 1} with λn = 1 for at most one n,
then either λn = 0 for all even n or λn = 0 for all odd n.
A weakening of LPO in a different direction is Markov’s principle (MP): that is, if
(λn)n∈N is an increasing sequence in {0, 1}, then
¬∀n ∈ N (λn = 0) =⇒ ∃n ∈ N (λn = 1).
An obvious consequence of MP is that every discrete ring A has semirecognisable
nilpotents, which is to say that
¬∀n ∈ N (an = 0) =⇒ ∃n ∈ N (an = 0)
for each a ∈ A.
Clearly, LPO is related to the halting problem for Turing machines, and MP represents
an unbounded search. Another good reason for not to accept LPO, WLPO, LLPO, and
MP as constructive principles is that each of them reflects an allegedly nonconstructive
statement about the real or complex numbers. So LPO follows from the assumption that R
17 The notion of a relative inequality was kindly pointed out to us by Henri Lombardi, who introduced it for
doing constructive algebra without negation but with the trivial ring.
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or C is discrete,18 and MP from the one that they come with the denial inequality, whose
decidability entails WLPO. Finally, LLPO is a consequence of
ab = 0 =⇒ a = 0 ∨ b = 0
for all real or complex numbers a, b, although its classical contrapositive
a = 0 ∧ b = 0 =⇒ ab = 0
holds in any field whatsoever.
Note that LPO, WLPO, and MP are tantamount to P∨¬P , ¬¬P∨¬P , and ¬¬P ⇒ P ,
respectively, for every statement P that is simply existential [7], which is to say that P is
of the form ∃n ∈ N (λn = 1) for a certain (without loss of generality, increasing) sequence
(λn)n∈N in {0, 1}. In particular, LPO is equivalent to the conjunction of MP and WLPO.
Likewise, LLPO amounts to ¬ (P ∧ Q) ⇒ ¬P ∨ ¬Q for simply existential statements
P, Q. See, for instance, [7,38] for more details.
Any talk of inequality aside, recall that a subset S of A is an ideal whenever
a = 0 =⇒ a ∈ S
a ∈ S ∧ b ∈ S =⇒ a + b ∈ S
a ∈ S ∨ b ∈ S =⇒ ab ∈ S
for all a, b ∈ A, and a radical ideal if, in addition,
∃n ∈ N (an ∈ S) =⇒ a ∈ S
for all a ∈ A. An arbitrary intersection of (radical) ideals is a (radical) ideal. If we set
I (b1, . . . , bm) = Ab1 + · · · + Abm
for b1, . . . , bm ∈ A and m ∈ N0, then
I (U) =
⋃
{I (b1, . . . , bm) : b1, . . . , bm ∈ U , m ∈ N0} (2)
is the ideal generated by U ⊂ A. If I is an ideal, then the radical of I
√
I = {a ∈ A : ∃n ∈ N (an ∈ I )}
is a radical ideal, and so is
R(U) = √I (U) (3)
for every U ⊂ A. As for I , we write R (b1, . . . , bm) in place of R ({b1, . . . , bm}). Note
that I (U) ⊂ R (U), and that U is inhabited whenever either I (U) has a non-zero element,
or R (U) has an element all of whose powers are not equal to 0.19
The following fairly trivial observation is sometimes useful.
18 In the presence of a weak form of countable choice [8] that is valid under classical logic without any choice,
LPO is even equivalent to this assumption. The analogous facts hold in the sequel for WLPO, LLPO, and MP.
19 We have chosen not to use the traditional notation (U) and
√
(U) for the ideal generated by any U ⊂ A and
the radical thereof, respectively: as they lack the dual versions that will be needed later, one may introduce new
notations anyway.
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Lemma 1. Let A be a commutative ring and b1, . . . , bm ∈ A . If a ∈ I (b1, . . . , bm), then
for every k ∈ N there is n ∈ N so that an ∈ I (bk1, . . . , bkm
)
; moreover, each n with n ≥ mk
will suffice.
Proof. Let n ∈ N be arbitrary, and assume that a ∈ I (b1, . . . , bm). Then an is a linear
combination of monomials bk11 · . . . · bkmm with ki ≥ 0 for every i and k1 + · · ·+ km = n. So
if n ≥ mk, then—for each of these monomials—ki ≥ k for some i ≤ m, because if ki < k
for all i ≤ m, then k1 + · · · + km < mk ≤ n, which is impossible. 
We also need to characterise radical ideals in a less usual way.
Lemma 2. A subset S of a commutative ring A is a radical ideal if and only if
U ⊂ S =⇒ R (U) ⊂ S (4)
for all (finite) U ⊂ A.
Proof. Suppose first that S is a radical ideal, and let a ∈ R (U): that is, an ∈ I (U) for
some n ∈ N. If U ⊂ S, then I (U) ⊂ S; whence an ∈ S, and thus a ∈ S. As for the
converse, assume that (4) holds for all finite U . Note that 0 ∈ S is the special case U = ∅
of (4), and let a, b ∈ A. If a ∈ S or b ∈ S, then ab ∈ S because ab ∈ I (a) ∩ I (b); if
a, b ∈ S, then a + b ∈ S because a + b ∈ I (a, b). Finally, if an ∈ S, then a ∈ S because
a ∈ R (an). So S is a radical ideal. 
If I is an ideal of a discrete ring A, and one equips A/I with the usual equality of
equivalence modulo I and with the corresponding denial inequality, then A/I is discrete
precisely when I is a detachable subset of A: that is, either a ∈ I or else a /∈ I for each
a ∈ A. We do not presuppose that every ideal in a discrete ring be detachable, although so
is every principal ideal of Z. For instance, the ideal of Z that is generated by the perfect
numbers is can hardly be expected to be detachable constructively (see Section 1), let alone
principal.
A ring A is a field whenever ∼ {0} = A∗, an integral domain whenever A is nontrivial
and
a = 0 ∧ b = 0 =⇒ ab = 0,
and a reduced ring if
a = 0 =⇒ ∀n ∈ N (an = 0) .
Every field is an integral domain, and every integral domain is a reduced ring.20
In [6], an inequality = on a ring A is called a ring inequality whenever = is translation
invariant (that is, a = b is equivalent to a − b = 0), and the multiplication in A is strongly
extensional with respect to =, which is to say that
ab = 0 =⇒ a = 0 ∧ b = 0 .
20 Our concepts of field and integral domain contain the ones used in [38], with which they coincide whenever
= is translation invariant and—in the case of integral domains—tight. In [59], however, = is generally assumed
to be a ring apartness.
P. Schuster / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 137 (2006) 317–359 331
On the other hand, = is cotransitive21 if + is strongly extensional with respect to = : that
is,
a + b = 0 =⇒ a = 0 ∨ b = 0 .
Note that the denial and the relative inequality always are (not necessarily cotransitive) ring
inequalities. A tight and cotransitive ring equality is a ring apartness. If A is discrete, then
= is a ring apartness coinciding with the denial inequality. A field with a ring apartness is
a Heyting field; in addition to all discrete fields, also R and C are Heyting fields.
An ideal S of the commutative ring A is a prime ideal whenever
ab ∈ S =⇒ a ∈ S ∨ b ∈ S
a ∈ S =⇒ ¬ (a = 1)
for all a, b ∈ A. Of course, the principal ideal (p) of Z that is generated by a prime number
p is a prime ideal, and so is {0} ⊂ Z. While every prime ideal is a radical ideal, the former
notion is constructively too narrow: that the zero ideal in R or C is prime amounts to accept
LLPO (see above), whereas {0} is a radical ideal in each of these Heyting fields.
Each ring A has a natural inequality with a = b if and only if a − b is invertible,
with which A becomes a field by definition, and which is a ring inequality. The natural
inequality is contained in (respectively, coincides with) an arbitrary inequality = on A if
and only if A is nontrivial (respectively, a field) with respect to =. In particular, the natural
inequality is consistent (respectively, standard) if and only if A is nontrivial (respectively,
a field classically) with respect to the denial inequality.
The natural inequality is cotransitive precisely when A is a local ring—that is,
a + b ∈ A∗ =⇒ a ∈ A∗ ∨ b ∈ A∗
for all a, b ∈ A. An equivalent definition of a ring A to be local is that for each a ∈ A
either a is invertible or 1 − a is invertible. So a Heyting field is nothing but a local ring
whose natural inequality is tight, with which it automatically is a nontrivial ring.
A subset S of A is a coideal [46] or anti-ideal [59, 8.3] whenever
a ∈ S =⇒ ¬ (a = 0)
a + b ∈ S =⇒ a ∈ S ∨ b ∈ S
ab ∈ S =⇒ a ∈ S ∧ b ∈ S
for all a, b ∈ A. By a power coideal we understand a coideal S of A with the additional
property
a ∈ S =⇒ ∀n ∈ N (an ∈ S)
for all a ∈ A. An arbitrary union of (power) coideals is a (power) coideal.
There is a characterisation of power coideals dual to that of radical ideals (Lemma 2).
21 If = is translation invariant, then = is cotransitive precisely when
a = b =⇒ a = c ∨ c = b
for all a, b, c ∈ A, whose contrapositive amounts to = being transitive whenever, in addition, = is tight [6].
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Lemma 3. A subset S of a commutative ring A is a power coideal if and only if
R (U)  S =⇒ U  S (5)
for all (finite) U ⊂ A.
Proof. Suppose first that S is a power coideal, and let a ∈ R (U), which is to say that
an ∈ I (U) for some n ∈ N. If, in addition, a ∈ S, then also an ∈ S; in particular,
an = 0. We thus have an = r1b1 + · · · + rmbm for certain m ∈ N, r1, . . . , rm ∈ A, and
b1, . . . , bm ∈ U ; whence bi ∈ S for some i , and bi for this i is a witness for U  S.
As for the converse, assume that (5) holds for all finite U . Note that 0 /∈ S is the
special case U = ∅ of (5), and let a, b ∈ A. If ab ∈ S, then a ∈ S and b ∈ S because
ab ∈ I (a) ∩ I (b); if a + b ∈ S, then either a ∈ S or b ∈ S because a + b ∈ I (a, b).
Finally, if a ∈ S, then an ∈ S because a ∈ R (an). So S is a power coideal. 
A prime coideal of A is a coideal that, in addition, is a multiplicative subset of the ring
A, where S ⊂ A is a multiplicative subset if it is a submonoid of the multiplicative monoid
of A, which is to say that
a ∈ S ∧ b ∈ S =⇒ ab ∈ S
a = 1 =⇒ a ∈ S
for all a, b ∈ A. Among the detachable subsets of a ring with the denial inequality,
the (respectively, power or prime) coideals are just the complements of the (respectively,
radical or prime) ideals.
Clearly, the empty subset ∅ is a power coideal, but not a prime coideal. If S is a coideal,
then S is inhabited precisely when 1 ∈ S or, equivalently, A∗ ⊂ S. An inhabited coideal S
of A is called a minimal coideal whenever for every a ∈ S there is b ∈ A so that 1−ab /∈ S.
If S is a minimal coideal and T an inhabited coideal with T ⊂ S, then T = S.
So every inhabited coideal lies between A∗ and ¬{0}, and A is nontrivial whenever it
has an inhabited coideal S with S ⊂∼ {0}. The subset A∗ is a coideal if and only if A is a
local ring that is nontrivial with respect to the denial inequality, in which case A∗ is even
a minimal coideal. On the other hand, ∼ {0} is a coideal precisely when = is cotransitive
and—possibly except for being translation invariant—a ring inequality. If this is the case,
then ∼ {0} is a power, prime, or minimal coideal if and only if A is a reduced ring, an
integral domain, or a field, respectively.
The complement ¬S of a (power) coideal S is a (radical) ideal, but the analogous
statement for prime (co)ideals fails constructively: the set of invertible elements ∼ {0}
in R or C is a minimal coideal, but {0} = ¬ ∼ {0} is constructively not even a prime ideal
in each of these Heyting fields (see above). So if S ⊂ A is a coideal, then there is the factor
ring A/¬S, equipped with the ring apartness for which the equivalence classes = 0 are the
ones of the elements of S.
Clearly, A/¬∅ is the trivial ring, and A/¬ ∼ {0} is isomorphic to A whenever A has
come with a ring apartness. If S is a coideal, then S is inhabited precisely when A/¬S is
nontrivial. Each coideal S is a power, prime, or minimal coideal if and only if A/¬S is
a reduced ring, an integral domain, or a (Heyting) field, respectively. In particular, every
minimal coideal is a prime coideal, and every prime coideal is a power coideal. If A∗ is a
coideal, then A/¬A∗ is a Heyting field.
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We often speak of prime coideals as of prime filters, following the use of this term
in [28, p. 192]. To justify this, we recall that a subset S of a ring A is a filter whenever
a = 1 =⇒ a ∈ S,
a ∈ S ∧ b ∈ S =⇒ ab ∈ S,
ab ∈ S =⇒ a ∈ S ∧ b ∈ S
for all a, b ∈ A, and a prime filter if, in addition,
a + b ∈ S =⇒ a ∈ S ∨ b ∈ S,
a ∈ S =⇒ ¬ (a = 0)
for all a, b ∈ A. Note that S is a prime filter if and only if it is a prime coideal if and only
if it is a filter and a coideal. The smallest filter is A∗, which is a prime filter if and only if
A is a local ring that is nontrivial with respect to the denial inequality (see above).
4. The covering relation
The basic ingredient of a formal topology is the underlying set A, which is often
assumed to be a multiplicatively written commutative monoid with unit, and whose
elements and subsets are called basic opens and arbitrary opens, respectively (Section 2).
Furthermore, a definition of a formal topology must at least include a covering relation ,
between basic and arbitrary opens, with aU being thought of as expressing that the basic
open set with index a ∈ A is contained in the union of all the basic open sets whose indices
belong to U ⊂ A. In the following, we loosely follow Sambin’s presentation of a formal
topology [47,49].
For an arbitrary set A, the defining properties of a covering relation (or simply covering)
 between elements and subsets of A are
Reflexivity a ∈ U =⇒ a U
Transitivity a U ∧ ∀b ∈ A (b ∈ U ⇒ b  V ) =⇒ a  V
for all a ∈ A and U, V ⊂ A. Equivalently, the operator U → U on the subsets of A with
U = {a ∈ A : a U}
for U ⊂ A is a closure operator on the subsets of A—that is, it satisfies
U ⊂ U , and U ⊂ V =⇒ U ⊂ V.
To extend  to a relation between arbitrary opens, one sets
U  V ⇐⇒ ∀b ∈ A (b ∈ U ⇒ b  V )
for U, V ⊂ A; then transitivity can be rewritten more suggestively as
a U ∧ U  V =⇒ a  V .
If A is a multiplicative monoid, then a covering relation  must also satisfy
Left a U ∨ b U =⇒ ab U
Right a U ∧ a  V =⇒ a U V
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for all a ∈ A and U, V ⊂ A, where
U V = {bc : b ∈ U, c ∈ V }
for U, V ⊂ A. (As usual, we denote the product a · b simply by ab.) Although one of the
antecedents of ‘left’ could be left out in the commutative case, we prefer to follow [49] and
write ‘left’ as it stands. ‘Right’, on the other hand, could equally be put with a  V U as
the consequent, even if A is not commutative—which, however, we suppose from now on.
An equivalent of the conjunction of ‘left’ and ‘right’ is
U ∩ V = (U V )
for all U, V ⊂ A. This is equivalent to the set of conditions
Weakening ab  a
Contraction a  aa
Stability a U ∧ b  V =⇒ ab U V
for all a ∈ A and U, V ⊂ A. (Here, as throughout, we identify each basic open a with
the singleton arbitrary open {a}.) By reflexivity and transitivity of , moreover, stability
amounts to
Localisation a U =⇒ ab Ub
for all a, b ∈ A and U ⊂ A. If, in addition, A possesses a unit 1, then reflexivity and ‘left’
yield that a  1 for all a ∈ A or, equivalently, 1 = A; whence U  1 for all U ⊂ A.
In a later version of formal topology [51,48], which was motivated by the need to
dispense with the monoid structure, ‘left’ and ‘right’ have been generalised to
Down a U ∧ a  V =⇒ a U ↓ V
with
U ↓ V = {d ∈ A : ∃b ∈ U (d  b) ∧ ∃c ∈ V (d  c)}
for all a ∈ A and U, V ⊂ A. Indeed, this does not involve the monoid multiplication,
in whose presence ‘down’ follows from ‘left’ and ‘right’ by virtue of reflexivity and
transitivity: then U V ⊂ U ↓ V ⊂ (U V ), so that (U ↓ V ) = (U V ). Note that
the converse of ‘down’ is an immediate consequence of transitivity and reflexivity.
The frame of arbitrary opens Open (A) is the collection of subsets of A with zero ∅, unit
A, meet U ∧ V = U V (or, in the absence of a monoid operation, U ∧ V = U ↓ V ), join∨
i∈I Ui =
⋃
i∈I Ui , the partial order given by the covering , and the equality defined
by setting
U ∼= V ⇐⇒ U  V ∧ V U
for U, V ⊂ A. The closure operator U → U maps Open (A) isomorphically onto the
frame of formal opens Sat (A), where an arbitrary open U is a formal open whenever it is
saturated with respect to the covering relation—that is, U equals its saturation U. The
formal opens form a frame Sat (A) with zero ∅, unit A, meet U ∧ V = U ∩ V (which
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equals (U V ) and, more generally, (U ↓ V )), join ∨i∈I Ui =
(⋃
i∈I Ui
)
, the partial
order given by inclusion, and the extensional equality of subsets as equality.
It depends on the given context whether one decides to work with Open (A) or Sat (A).
Note that the covering relation suffices to define both frames; there is no need of a monoid
structure. As either frame is a relatively unrestricted collection of subsets of the given
set A, both Open (A) and Sat (A) must be secondary to formal topology as a predicative
framework.
Of course, one could represent any given frame as the frame of (formal) opens of a
formal topology, with the names of a basis of that frame as the underlying set—provided,
however, that one can choose those names in such a way that they indeed form a set, which
is not clear at the outset. In this vein, formal topology can be understood as predicative
presentation of frames.
A covering  is a Stone covering or finitary covering if every basic open a is compact
in the sense that if a  U for an arbitrary open U , then already a  U0 for some finite
subset U0 of U . If the underlying set is a multiplicative monoid, and if  satisfies ‘left’
and ‘right’,22 then  is finitary precisely when the corresponding frame of (formal) opens
is a coherent frame—or, equivalently, a spectral locale. A formal topology with a covering
of this kind is simply called a Stone formal topology or finitary formal topology.
The Stone compactification  of a relation ≺, between basic opens and finite arbitrary
opens, is defined by setting a  U precisely when a ≺ U0 for some finite U0 ⊂ U . If 
is a Stone covering, then it coincides with the Stone compactification of its finitary trace
which is the induced relation between basic opens and finite arbitrary opens. We refer to
[47,40,41] for details on all this.
Now let A be a commutative ring. According to what we have observed before, we take
the multiplicative monoid of A as underlying to the formal Zariski topology associated
with A. The clue to a covering relation on this monoid is to remember that, within the
classical Zariski topology on Spec(A),
D(a) ⊂
⋃
b∈U
D(b) ⇐⇒ a ∈ R(U)
for all a ∈ A and U ⊂ A; see [28, V.3.2] for the analogous observation in the case of the
reticulation of A.
In view of the aforementioned intuition standing behind aU , it is appropriate to follow
Persson [44] by setting
a U ⇐⇒ a ∈ R(U)
for all a ∈ A and U ⊂ A. Note that I (∅) = 0, so that
R(∅) = {a ∈ A : ∃n ∈ N (an = 0)}
is the nilradical of A. In particular,
a  ∅ ⇐⇒ ∃n ∈ N (an = 0)
for every a ∈ A.
22 We are grateful to Silvia Gebellato for having pointed out to us these necessary preconditions.
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We carry out the next proof in detail, although most of it is in [44].
Proposition 4. Let A be a commutative ring. Then  is a covering relation: that is, it
is reflexive and transitive, and satisfies ‘left’ and ‘right’. In other words, R is a closure
operator with U ∩ V = (U V ) for all U, V ⊂ A.
Proof. Let a ∈ A and U, V ⊂ A. As R (U) is a radical ideal containing U , we have
‘left’, reflexivity, and transitivity (Lemma 2). Suppose now that a U and a  V , that is,
a p ∈ I (U) for some p ∈ N and aq ∈ I (V ) for some q ∈ N. Then a p+q ∈ I (U) I (V ) ⊂
I (U V ) , so that a U V , and ‘right’ is proved. 
It is intrinsic to the very definition of  that it is a Stone covering; we have already
made use of this fact in the foregoing proof. As R is the corresponding closure operator,
the frame of formal opens is the Zariski frame of A.
We now relate  to the covering defined by Lombardi and Quitté [32]. They say, for
multiplicative submonoids S, S1, . . . , Sm of A, that S is covered by S1, . . . , Sm whenever
S  I (s1, . . . , sm) for all s1 ∈ S1, . . . , sn ∈ Sm . In this vein, we set a  {b1, . . . , bm} for
a ∈ A and b1, . . . , bm ∈ A precisely when the multiplicative submonoid M (a) generated
by a is covered by M (b1) , . . . , M (bm). This relation  coincides with the finitary trace
of ; in particular, coincides with the Stone compactification of .
In fact, a  {b1, . . . , bm} if and only if M (a)  I (bk11 , . . . , bkmm ) for all k1, . . . , km ≥ 0;
which clearly implies a  {b1, . . . , bm} (just set ki = 1 for every i ). To see the converse,
assume that a  {b1, . . . , bm}, which is to say that a p ∈ I (b1, . . . , bm) for some p ∈ N.
Given k1, . . . , km ≥ 0, set k = max{k1, . . . , km}. Then a pmk ∈ I (bk1, . . . , bkm) ⊂
I (bk11 , . . . , b
km
m ) by Lemma 1; whence a  {b1, . . . , bm}.
It is in order to end this section by considering a possible objection. A covering relation
is in general an infinitary relation: it relates elements of A with possibly infinite subsets of
A. This may cause doubts from a strictly predicative perspective from which one prefers
not to consider infinite subsets at all; more specifically, one can well argue that already the
definition of a relation to be a covering consists in a universal quantification not only over
the basic opens, but also over the arbitrary opens. (The same concerns will come up when
we next deal with the positivity relation.)
In the context of the formal Zariski topology, however, there is absolutely no need to
worry about this: as for every finitary covering, it indeed suffices to restrict one’s attention
to finite subsets of A. In general, moreover, one ought to observe that the defining properties
of a covering are only to be satisfied by a relation that is already given, or presented by other
means, whereas these properties do not enter its very construction—unless one wishes to
define it as the narrowest relation possessing those properties, but even such inductive
definitions allow for a predicatively admissible modification. We refer to Section 6.1 and
to the discussion preceding it for more on this.
5. A candidate for positivity
In addition to a covering relation, one wishes to have at hand whenever possible a notion
of a ‘positivity’ whose unary version, a predicate pos(a) of basic opens a ∈ A, expresses
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the intuition that the basic open set with index a is inhabited. One of the roots of this
so-called positivity predicate is the consistency predicate from domain theory [53,48,41];
another one is the impredicative notion of positivity in locale theory (see below). We shall
elaborate in Section 6 on the more general notion of a positivity relation.
We first recall the concept of a positivity predicate from [47]. Given a set A with a
covering relation as above, a positivity predicate or unary positivity is a predicate pos(a)
of elements a of A. It is usually expected to satisfy
Monotonicity pos(a) ∧ a U =⇒ pos(U)
Openness a U =⇒ a U+
with the notation
pos(U) ⇐⇒ ∃b ∈ U (pos(b))
U+ = {b ∈ U : pos(b)}
for all a ∈ A and U ⊂ A.
However, as the instances of such a predicate that we will encounter in the sequel are
almost never both monotone and open, we shall use the terms ‘positivity predicate’ and
‘unary positivity’ for each predicate—neither necessarily monotone nor open—that we
consider as a candidate for such a notion, and make explicit when it enjoys one of these
properties.
In the presence of openness, monotonicity is tantamount to
Weak Monotonicity pos(a) ∧ a U =⇒ ∃b ∈ U.
Weak monotonicity and openness ensure that if there is a predicate satisfying both
conditions, then it is unique. More specifically, if pos1 is a weakly monotone predicate
and pos2 is open, then pos1 is contained in pos2. (We have first seen all this in [18].)
In Section 4, we have satisfactorily dealt with the covering relation for the formal
Zariski topology of a commutative ring A. We now turn our attention to the question how
to complete this picture with a positivity predicate.
Classically, the nilradical of A is the intersection of all prime ideals, in other words
∃n ∈ N (an = 0) ⇐⇒ ∀p ∈ Spec(A) (a ∈ p),
so that, still classically,
∀n ∈ N (an = 0) ⇐⇒ ∃ p ∈ D(a)
for all a ∈ A. Hence it is tempting to consider the left-hand side of the latter equivalence
as a possible candidate for a unary positivity.
In this vein, we set
Pos0(a) ⇐⇒ ∀n ∈ N
(
an = 0)
for every a ∈ A. Note that if = is a ring inequality, then Pos0(a) amounts to the existence
of infinitely many n with an = 0 (if am = 0, then an = 0 for all n ≤ m because
am = anam−n).
Clearly, Pos0 is weakly monotone: for a ∈ A and U ⊂ A , if Pos0(a) and a  U , then
an ∈ I (U) for some n and an = 0 also for this n, so that U is inhabited.
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As a by-product of the subsequent considerations, we shall see that Pos0 is open
precisely when A has recognisable nilpotents, in which case it is a decidable predicate,
and that Pos0 is monotone under slightly more general circumstances.
5.1. Monotonicity
We now investigate whether and when Pos0 is monotone.
Lemma 5. Let pos be a predicate on a commutative ring A. Then {a ∈ A : pos (a)} is a
power coideal if and only if pos is monotone.
Proof. This is nothing but a reformulation of Lemma 3; in particular, if pos satisfies
monotonicity for U = ∅, then pos (a) implies ¬ (a = 0) for all a ∈ A. 
This helps us to characterise the monotonicity of Pos0.
Lemma 6. Let A be a commutative ring with a ring inequality =.
1. If = is cotransitive, then
∀n ∈ N ((a + b)n = 0) =⇒ ∀n ∈ N (an = 0 ∨ bn = 0)
for all a, b ∈ A.
2. Pos0 is monotone if and only if
Pos0(a + b) =⇒ Pos0(a) ∨ Pos0(b) (6)
for all a, b ∈ A.
Proof. We first prove the first statement. For arbitrary n ∈ N, if (a + b)2n = 0, then an = 0
or bn = 0 whenever = is cotransitive: recall that (a + b)2n ∈ I (an, bn) as in Lemma 1.
As {a ∈ A : Pos0 (a)} has a priori all the defining properties a power coideal except for
(6), the second statement follows from Lemma 5. 
As any infinite conjunction, Pos0(a) is hard to verify unless it actually is a finite one.
When looking for neat conditions under which this is the case, one might tentatively
assume that the commutative ring A under consideration is reduced. Indeed, Pos0 is
monotone whenever A is a reduced ring and = a cotransitive ring inequality.
Many rings one might at first think of are reduced whenever they are equipped with
their usual inequalities. However, it is not recommended at all to restrict one’s attention
to reduced rings from the outset, because it is just the admission of non-zero nilpotents—
which, as algebraic infinitesimals, are indispensable for deformation theory—that to a large
extent makes up the power of modern algebraic geometry. (Compared with reducedness,
it is fairly mild to assume that the rings under consideration have a cotransitive ring
inequality.)
As soon as one has a closer—classical—look at the variety of rings naturally arising in
algebraic geometry, one realises that Pos0(a) is still a finite conjunction for most such rings
A and every a ∈ A.23 More specifically, and classically speaking, every finitely generated
23 The author is indebted to Otto Forster for having hinted at this circumstance.
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algebra A over a Noetherian ring is also Noetherian (by Hilbert’s basis theorem); whence
the nilradical of any such A possesses a finite set of generators.24 Therefore the nilradical
of A is nilpotent: that is, one can find k ∈ N such that
∃n ∈ N (an = 0) =⇒ ak = 0
for all a ∈ A.
In this vein, we call a ring A quasireduced if for every a ∈ A there is k ∈ N with
ak = 0 =⇒ ∀n ∈ N (an = 0),
and say that the ring A is uniformly quasireduced if such a k can be chosen independently
of a: as a universal exponent for A.25 If = is a ring inequality, then the principal issue of
(uniform) quasireducedness is that an = 0 for all the n > k (because ak = 0 automatically
implies that an = 0 for all n ≤ k). Needless to say, every reduced ring is uniformly
quasireduced, with universal exponent 1.
Every ring with recognisable nilpotents is quasireduced, and uniformly quasireduced
provided that, in addition, its nilradical is nilpotent. Indeed, if an = 0 for all n, then there
is nothing to prove, whereas if ak = 0 for some k ∈ N, then ak = 0 is impossible,
and any such k is a universal exponent whenever it may be chosen independently of the
nilpotent a under consideration. Conversely, every discrete (uniformly) quasireduced ring
has recognisable nilpotents (and a nilpotent nilradical): given k as in the definition of
‘(uniformly) quasireduced’, we can decide whether ak = 0 or ak = 0.
So quasireducedness is a classically trivial property, which its uniform version is not.
The standard example
B = Z[T1, T2, T3, . . .]
/
I
(
T 21 , T
3
2 , T
4
3 , . . .
)
of a ring whose nilradical is not nilpotent, let alone finitely generated, serves well as an
example of a ring that is not even classically uniformly quasireduced.26 We understand
B to be equipped with the usual equality of equivalence and the corresponding denial
inequality, with which it clearly is discrete, and we write tn for the equivalence class of
each Tn .
If B were uniformly quasireduced with a universal exponent k, then tnk = 0 for all n
(because clearly tkk = 0), which would contradict the fact that tnk = 0 for every n ≥ k + 1.
24 This classical understanding of ‘Noetherian’, that every ideal is finitely generated, is constructively void
already for the ideals of the field with two elements. We refer to [38, III.2, VIII.1] for constructively meaningful
variants of ‘Noetherian’ and Hilbert’s basis theorem.
25 Equivalently, A is quasireduced whenever
∀a ∈ A ∃k ∈ N∀n ∈ N
(
ak = 0 =⇒ an = 0
)
,
and uniformly quasireduced whenever
∃k ∈ N∀a ∈ A ∀n ∈ N
(
ak = 0 =⇒ an = 0
)
.
Silvia Gebellato has kindly drawn our attention to these formulations.
26 The author is grateful to Helmut Zöschinger for reminding him of this example.
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On the other hand, B has recognisable nilpotents, since for every F ∈ Z[T1, T2, T3, . . .]
the equivalence class f ∈ B of F is (not) nilpotent whenever the constant term F (0)
of F is (not) equal to 0, which is a decidable alternative. Indeed, there is k ∈ N with
F ∈ Z[T1, . . . , , Tk ], so that if F ∈ I (T1, . . . , Tk) is a sum of m nonconstant monomials,
then Fm(k+1) ∈ I (T k+11 , . . . , T k+1k ) according to Lemma 1, and thus f m(k+1) = 0.
The advantage of working in a quasireduced ring A is that to verify a finite—
actually, a singleton—conjunction suffices to achieve the validity of the infinite conjunction
Pos0(a).
Proposition 7. Let A be a commutative ring. If A is quasireduced and comes with a
cotransitive ring inequality =, then Pos0 is monotone.
Proof. We make use of both parts of Lemma 6. Let a, b ∈ A. As A is quasireduced,
there are p, q ∈ N so that if a p = 0, then Pos0(a), and if bq = 0, then Pos0(b). Set
k = max{p, q}. If Pos0(a + b), then either ak = 0 and thus a p = 0, or bk = 0 and thus
bq = 0. 
To present an interesting class of rings that are constructively uniformly quasireduced,
we consider, for arbitrary k ∈ N, the ring
Ck = C[T ]/I (T k)
whose prime spectrum is the k-fold point over a Heyting field C . More precisely, Ck =
C[T ]/¬ ∼ I (T k) with ¬ ∼ I (T k) = I (T k) according to [59, 8.5]. We write t for the
equivalence class of T ; whence tk = 0 and Ck = C[t], and equality and inequality are so
that
∑k−1
i=0 νi t i = 0 ⇐⇒ ∀i < k (νi = 0),∑k−1
i=0 νi t i = 0 ⇐⇒ ∃i < k (νi = 0).
Now let c = ∑k−1i=0 νi t i ∈ Ck , fix n ∈ N for the moment, and write cn =
∑k−1
i=0 µ
(n)
i t
i
.
Then µ(n)0 = νn0 , and µ(n)i is a multiple of ν0 whenever i < min{n, k}. It is routine to verify
that
∃n ∈ N (cn = 0) ⇐⇒ ν0 = 0 ⇐⇒ ck = 0
∀n ∈ N (cn = 0) ⇐⇒ ν0 = 0 ⇐⇒ ck = 0
for all c ∈ Ck . So Ck , which is reduced only for k = 1, is uniformly quasireduced for
every k ∈ N, with this k as a universal exponent. Note that Ck has recognisable nilpotents
(equivalently, Ck is discrete) precisely when C is discrete.
However, general discrete rings are constructively far from being quasireduced.
Proposition 8. The following items are equivalent.
1. The limited principle of omniscience (LPO).
2. Every discrete commutative ring has recognisable nilpotents.
3. Every discrete commutative ring is quasireduced.
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Proof. It remains to show that the last item implies the first. To this end, let (λn)n∈N be an
increasing sequence in {0, 1}, and equip
D = Z[T ]/I ({λn T n : n ∈ N})
with the equality of equivalence and the corresponding denial inequality. We write t for the
equivalence class of T ; whence D = Z[t] with
tn = 0 ⇐⇒ λn = 1 and tn = 0 ⇐⇒ λn = 0 .
Then it is easy to show that D is discrete. If D is quasireduced, then there is k ∈ N so that
if tk = 0, then tn = 0 for all n. Now we either have tk = 0 or tk = 0. In the former case,
λk = 1 for this k, whereas in the latter case λn = 0 for all n. 
Note that LPO already follows from the second or third item of Proposition 8 when this
is restricted to discrete commutative rings that, as Z-algebras, have a single generator—as
the ring D in the proof.
The converse of Proposition 7 cannot be expected to hold constructively in general.
Corollary 9. LPO follows from the statement that, for every discrete commutative ring A,
if Pos0 is monotone, then A is quasireduced.
Proof. It suffices to verify, by the second part of Lemma 6, that Pos0 is monotone for
the ring D in the proof of Proposition 8. To this end, let f, g ∈ D. If f (0) = 0, then
f n = f (0)n + t (. . .) = 0 for all n, and likewise if g(0) = 0, so that there is nothing to
prove. Hence we may assume that f (0) = g (0) = 0, in which case f + g is a multiple of
t for some  ∈ N. If now Pos0 ( f + g), then tn = 0 for all n; whence λn = 0 for all n
and thus D = Z[T ] is reduced, so that Pos0 ( f ) or Pos0 (g) as required. 
One cannot even prove constructively that Pos0 is monotone for an arbitrary discrete
ring.27
Proposition 10. The following items are equivalent.
1. The lesser limited principle of omniscience (LLPO).
2. For every discrete commutative ring A and all a, b ∈ A,
∀n ∈ N (an = 0 ∨ bn = 0) =⇒ ∀n ∈ N (an = 0) ∨ ∀n ∈ N (bn = 0) .
3. Pos0 is monotone for every discrete commutative ring.
Proof. To deduce the second item from LLPO, let A be a discrete commutative ring, and
a0, a1 ∈ A such that for each n ∈ N either an0 = 0 or an1 = 0. Now define iteratively a
sequence (λn)n∈N in {0, 1} by setting λ1 = 0 and
λ2k+i = 0 ⇐⇒ aki = 0 ∨ ∃m < 2k + i (λm = 1)
λ2k+i = 1 ⇐⇒ aki = 0 ∧ ∀m < 2k + i (λm = 0)
27 The author thanks Douglas Bridges for encouraging him to keep to LLPO in this context.
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for each i ∈ {0, 1} and every k ∈ N, for which clearly λn = 1 for at most one n. If we
assume that LLPO is valid, then λ2k+i = 0 for some i ∈ {0, 1} and all k ∈ N. Hence
ani = 0 for this i and all n. Indeed, if for any k there is m < 2k + i with λm = 1, then
m = 2 + 1 − i for some . Therefore a1−i = 0 and thus an1−i = 0 for all n ≥  , so that
ani = 0 for all n.
To show that the second item implies the third, it suffices to invoke both parts of
Lemma 6. To regain LLPO from the last item, let (λn)n∈N be a sequence in {0, 1} with
λ1 = 0 and λn = 1 for at most one n, and set
E = Z[T0, T1]/I ({T ki : λ2k+i = 1, k ∈ N, i ∈ {0, 1}}) .
Equipped with the equality of equivalence and the corresponding denial inequality, E is
discrete. Indeed, if we write ti for the equivalence class of Ti , then
tni = 0 ⇐⇒ ∃k ≤ n (λ2k+i = 1)
tni = 0 ⇐⇒ ∀k ≤ n (λ2k+i = 0)
for each i ∈ {0, 1} and n ∈ N. It is routine to verify that Pos0 (t0 + t1), so if Pos0 is
monotone for E , then, by the second part of Lemma 6, Pos0 (ti ) for some i ∈ {0, 1};
whence λ2k+i = 0 for this i and all k ∈ N. 
As with Proposition 8, to achieve LLPO it suffices to assume the second or third item of
Proposition 10 for every discrete commutative ring that, as a Z-algebra, has two generators,
such as the ring E in the proof.
In particular, weak monotonicity is (constructively) weaker than monotonicity.
5.2. Openness
Apart from the trivial case of a ring with recognisable nilpotents, the openness of
Pos0 will turn out to be essentially nonconstructive even in situations in which Pos0 is
monotone. We now attempt to justify this seeming defect, which eventually will prove to
be unavoidable even in the case of a fairly simple discrete ring.
First, the presence of an open and monotone positivity predicate on a formal topology
is equivalent to the corresponding frame of opens being an open locale as defined, for
instance, in [29] (see [18] for more details). An arbitrary locale L is open if and only if for
each U ⊂ L covering some U ∈ L the subset U+ of U consisting of its positive elements
still covers U ; in other words, the nonpositive elements are irrelevant for the covering, and
thus may be left out. But what does ‘positive’ mean?
The locale-theoretic definition of an element U of L to be positive is that every subset
U of L which covers U is inhabited. As this involves quantification over the subsets of
L, it is an impredicative definition. Therefore it had to be given up in formal topology,
where instead a positivity predicate was stipulated as an extra datum. Monotonicity was
introduced as an axiom to capture the meaning of ‘positive’, and openness as a useful
condition that later turned out to correspond to the concept of an open locale.
From this perspective, openness is more loosely tied to the notion of a positivity
predicate than monotonicity is: as for locales, openness is an extra feature that may be
given in some but not all cases. Note also that openness has a certain flavour of point-set
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topology: every spatial locale is open [29, p. 99], and if a formal topology has enough
(formal) points, then openness holds (Proposition 26 below).
In [15, Proposition 5], monotonicity and openness were justified by the observation
that if a formal topology carries a monotone and open pos, then pos (a) is equivalent to
POS (a) for every basic open a, where the latter is defined—as impredicatively as ‘positive’
in locale theory—by setting
POS (a) ⇐⇒ ∀U ⊂ A (a U ⇒ ∃b ∈ U)
for every a. More specifically, if pos is weakly monotone, then pos (a) implies POS(a) for
every basic open a, and if pos is open, then the reverse implication holds. Note that POS is
weakly monotone by its very definition.
In other words, while the weak monotonicity of a predicatively presented pos guarantees
that it stays within its impredicative counterpart POS, openness ensures that the former
fully covers the meaning of the latter. Just as when passing to constructive reasoning,
however, one often needs to strengthen some concepts when one wishes to admit
predicative definitions only. It therefore is not surprising to encounter positivity predicates
that are (weakly) monotone, but fail to be open constructively.
Next, openness allows us to drop the nonpositive elements of an arbitrary open that
covers a basic open without deciding the possibly nonconstructive alternative whether any
given element of the former is positive or not. In proof practice, openness even allows us
to certain distinctions-by-cases that otherwise would have to be left out for then remaining
purely classical.
To explain this in more details, let A for the moment denote an arbitrary set with a
(reflexive and transitive) covering relation. According to [47,53], openness is equivalent,
within intuitionistic logic, to the conjunction of the two conditions
Proofs by cases (pos(a) ⇒ a U) ∧ (¬pos(a) ⇒ a U) =⇒ a U
Ex falso quodlibet ¬pos(a) =⇒ a  ∅
for all a ∈ A and U ⊂ A.
The converse of ‘ex falso quodlibet’, and that pos(a) implies ¬ (a  ∅), are immediate
consequences of weak monotonicity. If pos is a decidable predicate, then ‘proofs by cases’
trivially holds; whence openness is equivalent to ‘ex falso quodlibet’ in any such case.
The following observation is readily made.
Lemma 11. Let pos be a weakly monotone predicate on a set A with a covering relation
. Then pos is decidable and satisfies ‘ex falso quodlibet’ precisely when for every a ∈ A
either pos(a) or a ∅. In this case, pos is open, and pos(a) and a ∅ are the negations of
each other.
As  is reflexive and transitive, one may replace the only occurrence of ∅ in ‘ex falso
quodlibet’ by that of an arbitrary U ⊂ A. Besides perhaps justifying the choice of the name
for ‘ex falso quodlibet’, this observation makes visible that
Positivity (pos(a) ⇒ a U) =⇒ a U
for all a ∈ A and U ⊂ A is another equivalent of openness [47].
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When one proves directly that positivity is equivalent to openness, one realises the
analogous fact that ‘proofs by cases’ is tantamount to
a U =⇒ a U+ ∪ U− (7)
for all a ∈ A and U ⊂ A, where
U− = {b ∈ U : ¬pos(b)} .
The following result sharpens a proposition by Negri [41].
Proposition 12. Let pos be a weakly monotone predicate on a set A with a Stone covering
. Then pos is decidable if and only if it satisfies ‘proofs by cases’.
Proof. The ‘only if’ part is obvious. As for the ‘if’ part, let a ∈ A, and assume that (7)
holds for U = {a}. As aa, we thus have aa+ ∪a−. Since is a Stone covering, there
is a finite subset U0 of a+∪a− with aU0. As a finite set, U0 is either empty or inhabited.
In the former case, a  ∅ and thus ¬pos(a), because pos is weakly monotone. In the latter
case, there is b ∈ U0, for which either b ∈ a+ or b ∈ a−. If b ∈ a+, then b equals a and
pos(b), so that pos (a). If b ∈ a−, then b equals a and ¬pos(b), so that ¬pos (a). 
By virtue of Lemma 11, we have an obvious consequence.
Corollary 13. Let pos be a weakly monotone predicate on a set A with a Stone covering
. Then pos is open if and only if for every a ∈ A either pos(a) or a  ∅.
Let now again A be a commutative ring. In general, Pos0 (a) is equivalent to ¬ (a  ∅)
whenever = is the denial inequality. By Corollary 13, Pos0 is open precisely when A has
recognisable nilpotents. ‘Ex falso quodlibet’ and ‘proofs by cases’ for Pos0 are equivalent
to A having semirecognisable nilpotents and weakly recognisable nilpotents, respectively
(for the latter, see Proposition 12).
However, we cannot expect a constructive proof, valid for arbitrary discrete A, that Pos0
satisfies any of those equivalents. This is made explicit by the following three propositions,
for which we refer to Proposition 8 and to Corollary 13 (and, wherever necessary, to the
proof of the former). One might also compare them with the facts that LPO is equivalent
to the conjunction of WLPO and MP, and that ‘open’ amounts to ‘proofs by cases’ and ‘ex
falso quodlibet’.
Proposition 14. The following items are equivalent.
1. The limited principle of omniscience (LPO).
2. For every discrete commutative ring A and every a ∈ A either Pos0(a) or a  ∅.
3. Pos0 is open for every discrete commutative ring.
Proposition 15. The following items are equivalent.
1. The weak limited principle of omniscience (WLPO).
2. Every discrete commutative ring has weakly recognisable nilpotents.
3. Pos0 satisfies ‘proofs by cases’ for every discrete commutative ring.
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Proposition 16. The following items are equivalent.
1. Markov’s principle (MP).
2. Every discrete commutative ring has semirecognisable nilpotents.
3. Pos0 satisfies ‘ex falso quodlibet’ for every discrete commutative ring.
As with Proposition 8, to deduce the first item in each of the foregoing propositions
from the second or third it suffices to suppose the latter for discrete commutative rings
that, as Z-algebras, have a single generator.
For a general commutative ring A, if Pos0 is open, then Pos0 is decidable and A is
quasireduced (because A has recognisable nilpotents in any such case, see Corollary 13);
whence Pos0 is monotone provided that, in addition, A comes with a cotransitive ring
inequality (Proposition 7). However, we cannot expect a constructive proof of the reverse
implication for arbitrary discrete A.
Corollary 17. LPO follows from the statement that, for every discrete commutative ring
A, if Pos0 is monotone, then it is open.
Proof. Let A = D be the discrete ring given in the proof of Proposition 8. Then Pos0 is
monotone for this ring (see the proof of Corollary 9). If Pos0 is open, then Proposition 14
applies. 
A related result in a (yet) different context is [15, Corollary 3].28 As a consequence of
Corollary 17, notice that if every positivity predicate pos on a Stone formal topology is
open whenever it is monotone, then LPO holds. In particular, openness is constructively
independent of monotonicity for Stone formal topologies.29
In the most general version of a basic formal topology to be recalled in the next
section—when a positivity predicate is derived from a positivity relation—it does not make
much sense to ask for openness (Corollary 25), whereas one always has monotonicity
for granted. Moreover, one gets back nothing but Pos0 whenever this is monotone
(Proposition 22), a condition which is classically trivial but essentially nonconstructive
(Corollary 24). Therefore we do not regret that Pos0 fails in general to be open and
monotone constructively, although it was designed to meet the intended meaning of a
positivity predicate as perfectly as possible.
6. The positivity relation
We now extend the formal Zariski spectrum by defining a binary positivity, or positivity
relation, along the lines of the so-called basic picture. Roughly speaking, the basic
28 Thierry Coquand has kindly pointed out this reference to us, where—although this was not made explicit—
the nonconstructive character of a certain inductive positivity predicate is equally caused by its openness only.
29 This contrasts to the context of locales, at least in the presence of a certain version of the axiom of choice:
that of the prime ideal theorem for distributive lattices [28, p. 78]. Then every spectral locale is spatial [28, II.3.4],
and thus open [29, p. 99]. That every spectral locale is open hinges upon the presence of the axiom of choice: in
topos theory there is a simple example, based on the Sierpinski locale, of a spectral locale that is not open. We
owe the latter information to Steve Vickers, who ascribes it to Peter Johnstone.
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picture has been started in a series of papers by Gebellato and Sambin [51,50,22,23] as
a systematic method of studying the interplay between the so-called concrete aspects of
topological spaces and continuous mappings that involve points, and their formal, point-
free counterparts. So far a wealth of connections (symmetries, isomorphies, and dualities)
has been revealed by way of the basic picture, of which we shall soon employ a fairly
fundamental one for heuristic purposes.
Before so doing, it is in order to sketch an elementary but principal motivation for adding
the notion of a binary positivity to the data of a formal topology. To this end, let A be a
basis of open sets of a topological space X (in the concrete sense, based on points), and
consider A as the underlying set of the corresponding formal topology. For the sake of the
argument, we do not bother about issues of predicativity during this heuristic consideration,
so whether any such A really is a set.
For x, y ∈ X , T ⊂ X , a, b ∈ A, and U ⊂ A, the naturally given covering on A is so
that membership of the formal closure
a ∈ U ⇐⇒ ∀ y ∈ a ∃ b  y (b ∈ U) (8)
is completely symmetric to membership of the concrete closure
x ∈ T ⇐⇒ ∀ b  x ∃ y ∈ b (y ∈ T ) , (9)
where the symmetry is that between points and basic open sets given via the elementhood
relation. One might compare this observation with the fact, noticed before, that the operator
U → U is—just as T → T —a closure operator.
Constructively, complementation is not a well-behaved operator on subsets. Hence
interior and closure, just as openness and closedness, have to be treated as related but
separate issues rather than simply defining one through the other. Now membership of the
concrete interior reads as
x ∈ ˚T ⇐⇒ ∃ b  x ∀ y ∈ b (y ∈ T ) . (10)
Following the same path as from (8) to (9) but now in the reverse direction, one ends up at
a ∈ U ? ⇐⇒ ∃ y ∈ a ∀ b  y (b ∈ U), (11)
which not surprisingly defines an interior operator U → U ?, similar to T → ˚T . Instead
of invoking the symmetry between points with basic open sets, to arrive at (11) one may
equally have dualised (8) by replacing each occurrence of ∀ and ∃ by one of ∃ and ∀,
respectively, in the same way in which one may pass from (9) to (10).
A more refined duality becomes necessary when one wishes to distinguish more sharply
between membership of a subset and membership of the whole set, as in [52]. Then (8) and
(11) have to be reformulated as
a ∈ U ⇐⇒ ∀ y ∈ X ( y ∈ a ⇒ ∃ b ∈ A (y ∈ b ∧ b ∈ U)) ,
a ∈ U ? ⇐⇒ ∃ y ∈ X ( y ∈ a ∧ ∀ b ∈ A (y ∈ b ⇒ b ∈ U)) ,
respectively; whence one needs to replace, in addition, each occurrence of ⇒ by one of ∧
and vice versa.
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This can easily be justified from every perspective, such as Martin-Löf type theory [36],
from which propositions are identified with sets, and proofs with elements. Then P ⇒ Q
reads as P ⊂ Q, which in turn amounts to ∀x ∈ P (x ∈ Q). By the common duality
between ∃ and ∀, the latter statement is dual to ∃x ∈ P (x ∈ Q), and thus to P  Q or—
back to the propositional interpretation—to P ∧ Q. (To avoid ending up with Q  P and
Q ∧ P , one has to take into account that P plays the role of an index set, as one over which
either quantification takes place, whereas Q is relatively arbitrary.)
For all this, it should be clear that the statement a ? U—that is, a ∈ U ?—is of
considerable interest. One of the achievements of the basic picture was to understand it
as the intended meaning of a new relation  between basic opens a and arbitrary opens U
of any formal topology whatsoever. The name chosen for it, binary positivity or positivity
relation, is motivated by the fact that, for a concrete topological space, the predicate a ? A
of basic open sets a is tantamount to a being inhabited, which is nothing but the intended
meaning of the unary positivity or positivity predicate evaluated at a.
The following axioms for such a new relation , which of course are satisfied by its
concrete forerunner ? considered above, were first proposed in [51]. Given an arbitrary
formal topology with A as the underlying set of basic opens and a covering relation , a
positivity relation or binary positivity is a second relation a  U between basic opens a
and arbitrary opens U . It is required to fulfil the conditions
Coreflexivity a  U =⇒ a ∈ U
Cotransitivity a  V ∧ ∀b ∈ A (b  V ⇒ b ∈ U) =⇒ a  U
as well as
Compatibility a  U ∧ a  V =⇒ V  U
for all a ∈ A and U, V ⊂ A with the notation
V  U ⇐⇒ ∃b ∈ A (b ∈ V ∧ b  U) .
In other words, the operator U → U on the subsets of A with
U = {a ∈ A : a  U}
is an interior operator, that is,
U ⊂ U , and V ⊂ U =⇒ V ⊂ U ,
and it is compatible with the closure operator in the sense that
U  V =⇒ U  V .
It is worth pointing out that coreflexivity and cotransitivity of the positivity relation
are perfectly dual to reflexivity and transitivity of the covering relation. As with the latter
conditions, moreover, the monoid structure does not enter the former ones at all; whence
one may define a basic formal topology to be simply a set A together with two relations
 and , between elements and subsets of A, which satisfy reflexivity, transitivity,
coreflexivity, cotransitivity, and compatibility. When one adds ‘down’ to these defining
conditions of a basic formal topology, one gets the concept of a balanced formal topology,
which includes as a special case that A be equipped with a monoid structure (see above).
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Note furthermore that  is compatible with  if and only if a  U is a monotone
predicate of a ∈ A for all U ⊂ A. When one decides to step back from a binary positivity
 to its unary forerunner, and sets
Pos(a) ⇐⇒ a  A
for a ∈ A as in [48], then Pos is monotone by the compatibility of , and satisfies
a  V =⇒ Pos(a) (12)
for all a ∈ A and V ⊂ A by the special case U = A of the cotransitivity of . (The
coreflexivity of  does not contribute anything to the properties of Pos, as it is trivially
satisfied for U = A.)
We now return to the case of a commutative ring A. In the case of the concrete Zariski
spectrum of A, the relation a ?U we have considered in (11) reads as
∃ p ∈ Spec(A) (p ∈ D(a) ∧ ∀ b ∈ A (p ∈ D(b) ⇒ b ∈ U)) . (13)
An equivalent formulation of (13) is
∃ p ∈ Spec(A) (a ∈ A \ p ⊂ U) , (14)
but even if we interpret this as that a belongs to a prime coideal contained in U , it still
involves points: as we shall see later, the prime filters of A are precisely the formal points
of the formal Zariski topology (Proposition 27).
While looking for properties of a relation between a and U which entail that it is a
binary positivity, one realises soon that, fortunately, a condition weaker than (14) suffices:
namely, that only some power coideal lies between a and U . Although this relation still
involves some quantification over subsets, its choice is necessary in view of the following
observation.
Lemma 18. Let A be a commutative ring,  a relation between elements and subsets of
A, and U ⊂ A. Then U is a power coideal if and only if compatibility holds for this U
and all (finite) V ⊂ A.
Proof. With a  U in place of pos(a), this is a special instance of Lemma 5; the particular
case a = 0 and V = ∅ of compatibility ensures that U ⊂ ¬{0}. 
As consequences of the definitions of I (U) and R(U), we furthermore notice that
I (U) =
⋂
{I ⊂ A : I ideal, I ⊃ U} , (15)
R(U) =
⋂
{R ⊂ A : R radical ideal, R ⊃ U} ; (16)
so I (U) and R(U) are the smallest ideal and radical ideal, respectively, that contain U .
To avoid any vicious circle, one must not define I (U) and R(U) through (15) and (16),
because then the definiendum would occur, as one of the (radical) ideals containing U ,
already within the definiens, the intersection of all those (radical) ideals. Nothing hinders
us, however, from asserting and proving (15) and (16) as immediate consequences of the
comparatively descriptive definitions of I (U) and R(U) that have been given before with
(2) and (3).
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Dualising (15) and (16), we provisionally set
C(U) =
⋃
{C ⊂ A : C coideal, C ⊂ U} , (17)
P(U) =
⋃
{P ⊂ A : P power coideal, P ⊂ U} , (18)
which are the largest coideal and power coideal, respectively, that are contained in U .
Equally provisionally, we define
a  U ⇐⇒ a ∈ P(U) (19)
for all a ∈ A and U ⊂ A.
The provisional character of these definitions is only because of the possible suspicion,
with which we do not completely agree (see below), that they might not be fully predicative
either. As we will justify them in a moment anyway, by a coinductive generation which, in
addition, has the following proposition as a by-product, one may accept these definitions
at least as a façon de parler.
Proposition 19. Let A be a commutative ring. Then  is a positivity relation: that is, it is
coreflexive, cotransitive, and compatible with . Moreover, P is the largest operator on
the subsets of A that is compatible with R, and for which P (U) ⊂ U for all U ⊂ A.
Proof. By definition, P (U) ⊂ U , and if P(U) ⊂ V , then P(U) ⊂ P(V ), which is to say
that P is an interior operator. By Lemma 18, P is compatible with R. On the other hand, if
Q is an operator on the subsets of A that is compatible with R, then Q is a power coideal
(Lemma 18). If, moreover, Q (U) ⊂ U , then Q (U) ⊂ P (U). 
In view of
R(U) = {a ∈ A : M(a)  I (U)}
with
M(a) = {an : n ∈ N0
}
,
one might recall the dualities peculiar to the basic picture and think of
Q(U) = {a ∈ A : M(a) ⊂ C(U)}
as another candidate for an interior operator. However, if Q is compatible with R, then
Q (U) ⊂ P (U), so that Q (U) = P (U) because P (U) ⊂ Q (U): if a ∈ P (U), then
M (a) ⊂ P (U).
Unlike the case of (15) and (16), we hold it is less likely that one would get caught
in any trap of impredicativity when we use (17) and (18) as definitions: to establish any
given a ∈ A as an element of the largest (power) coideal contained in U , one has to find
an arbitrary (power) coideal that lies between a and U , no matter whether this eventually
turns out to coincide with the actually largest one.
One may admit that to introduce membership of C(U) and P(U) seems harmless, but
suspect that to eliminate membership causes doubts: given a ∈ P(U), say, how can one
find a power coideal P with a ∈ P ⊂ U without having to check, at least in the worst
case, all the power coideals of A? A possible argument against the latter objection is that
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an assertion like a ∈ P(U) should anyway be understood, at least tacitly, as the presence
of such a witness P .
To avoid entering this discussion more deeply, and to do away with further reservations,
we will next (re-)define P(U) by way of a coinductive generation, which allegedly looks
safe from the predicative standpoint. Before so doing, we notice that the case is as with the
interior ˚T versus the closure T of each subset T of a concrete topological space, whose
interaction gave rise to the basic picture (see above). To define T ‘from above’, as the
smallest closed superset of T , definitely involves self-reference; whence this is better done
by way of (9). On the other hand, it seems less problematic to define ˚T ‘from below’, as
the largest open subset of T ; in fact this is nothing but (10).
6.1. Simultaneous generation
Unlike the case of I and R, it is not plain at all how C and P could intrinsically be
described in terms of the algebraic structure of A. We are nonetheless able to modify the
canonical inductive generation which  admits as a Stone covering [16] so that it carries
over to a coinductive generation of . By so doing, we provide a simultaneous generation
of  and  as it has been proposed by Martin-Löf and Sambin [49]30; whence in the
present case there is no need to use the more general approach put forward by Valentini [60]
by which  and  can be (co)inductively generated independently from each other. We
refer to [9] for a detailed treatment of induction and coinduction within type theory.
To recall briefly the general idea of an inductive generation, we consider the original
case, the set N of natural numbers. This is inductively generated by the introduction rules
1 ∈ N and n ∈ N ⇒ n + 1 ∈ N. In other words, N is the smallest set satisfying these
rules or, equivalently, it satisfies the elimination rule—perhaps more widely known as the
principle of complete induction (sic!) for natural numbers—which says that if S is a set
such that 1 ∈ S and n ∈ S ⇒ n + 1 ∈ S, then N ⊂ S.
When it comes to inductively generate covering relations, one might first think
of reflexivity and transitivity as suitable introduction rules. The latter one, however,
immediately causes doubts from a predicative perspective: the antecedent a U ∧ U  V
requires the existence of an intermediate arbitrary open U that does not occur in the
consequent a  V , and thus to quantify over general subsets U . The case is as with proofs
involving modus ponens: when one wishes to follow inductive generations containing
occurrences of transitivity in the backwards direction, then one may encounter an instance
of a  V that possibly stems from a  U ∧ U  V for a yet unknown intermediate term
U , and in the worst case one may be bound to check all the subsets to find the right one.
A way out of this situation was proposed in [16], which we now summarise. Let A be
an arbitrary set, and assume that we are given a family of index sets J (a) with a ∈ A, and
a family of subsets D (a, j) of A with a ∈ A and j ∈ J (a). The intended meaning of all
this is that, for each a ∈ A, every j ∈ J (a) is a name for a subset D (a, j) that covers a;
so that the relation < with
30 The author wishes to thank Giovanni Sambin and Per Martin-Löf for having insisted on the viability of this
road also in the case of formal Zariski topology.
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a < U ⇐⇒ ∃ j ∈ J (a) (D (a, j) ⊂ U)
for a ∈ A and U ⊂ A is a first candidate for a covering relation.
As < need not satisfy reflexivity and transitivity, to arrive at a proper covering one has
to ‘close’ < with respect to these conditions. To this end, one defines  as the relation
inductively generated by the introduction rules
Reflexivity a ∈ U =⇒ a U
Infinity j ∈ J (a) ∧ D (a, j)U =⇒ a U
for a ∈ A and U ⊂ A. In other words,  is the narrowest relation satisfying reflexivity
and infinity: it enjoys the elimination rule which says that if ′ is any relation between
elements and subsets of A such that reflexivity and infinity hold with ′ in place of ,
then  is already contained in ′ . Moreover,  is not only reflexive and transitive, but
also contains <; indeed it is the narrowest relation with all these features. In particular, if
< happens to be a covering relation, then  coincides with <.
In the case of a Stone covering, if
J (a) = {U0 ⊂ A : U0 finite, a U0} (a ∈ A)
is a family of sets, then
D (a, U0) = U0 (a ∈ A, U0 ∈ J (a))
is a family of subsets of A. With these data, every Stone covering  is inductively
generated [16]. As < coincides with  in any such case, at first glance there seems to
be no real need of doing inductive generation for Stone coverings. However, the method
of (co)inductive definition immediately becomes useful as soon as one aims at equally
providing positivity relations.
Indeed, in [49] one defines  as the relation that is coinductively generated by the
cointroduction31 rules
Coreflexivity a  U =⇒ a ∈ U
Coinfinity j ∈ J (a) ∧ a  U =⇒ D (a, j)  U
for a ∈ A and U ⊂ A. In other words,  is the widest relation satisfying coreflexivity
and coinfinity: it enjoys the coelimination rule which say that if ′ is any relation between
elements and subsets of A such that coreflexivity and coinfinity hold with ′ in place of
, then ′ is already contained in .
This  is coreflexive and cotransitive; moreover, if  and  are generated inductively
and coinductively, respectively, with the same families J (a) and D (a, j), then  is
automatically compatible with . In this vein, we say that  and  are simultaneously
generated whenever they are generated inductively and coinductively, respectively, for an
appropriate common choice of the families J (a) and D (a, j).
The following has been stated in [49], and a proof can be found in [37].
31 Without the prefix ‘co’, which in this context we have seen in [9], one ought to switch the names ‘elimination’
and ‘introduction’ when passing from inductive to coinductive generation: they would match their meaning only
then.
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Proposition 20. If  and  are simultaneously generated relations on a set A, then A
together with  and  is a basic formal topology.
Note that if  was already given, if it is a Stone covering, and if J (a) and D (a, j) are
as above for any Stone covering, then (co)infinity is nothing but (co)transitivity for finite
intermediate terms.
To return to the case of the formal Zariski topology, let A be a commutative ring with the
covering defined in Section 4. We choose J (a) and D (a, j) as for any Stone covering;
in other words, we set
J (a) = {U0 ⊂ A : U0 finite, a ∈ R (U0)} (a ∈ A) ,
D (a, U0) = U0 (a ∈ A, U0 ∈ J (a)) .
With this choice of the families J (a) and D (a, j), we now redefine  and  as the
relations simultaneously generated by reflexivity and infinity as well as by coreflexivity
and coinfinity.32
The following unwinding of infinity and coinfinity helps to see that we thus get nothing
but the relations and  which we have already considered before. To start with, observe
that infinity reads as
U0 ⊂ U =⇒ R (U0) ⊂ U (U0 ⊂ A, U0 finite) ; (20)
whence the narrowest relation  satisfying infinity and reflexivity is nothing but the
covering relation  with U = R (U) as the smallest radical ideal that contains U
(compare Lemma 2). Dually, the essence of coinfinity is
R (U0)  U =⇒ U0  U (U0 ⊂ A, U0 finite) , (21)
so that the widest relation satisfying coinfinity and coreflexivity coincides with the
positivity relation  that we have provisionally defined earlier on: with U = P(U)
as the largest power coideal that is contained in U (compare Lemma 3).
In view of Proposition 20, we have the following.
Corollary 21. For every commutative ring A, the relations  and  are simultaneously
generated; whence the formal Zariski topology of A is a basic formal topology.
As a by-product we regain Proposition 19, and parts of Proposition 4.
32 As we have done in [54], one may impose the extra rules
Zero a = 0 =⇒ a U Cozero a U =⇒ a = 0
when simultaneously generating  and . In view of ∅ ∈ J (0), ‘zero’ is redundant anyway. ‘Cozero’, on the
other hand, follows from compatibility whenever = stands for the denial inequality (compare Lemma 18), in
which case there is no need of requiring ‘cozero’ to ensure that U is a (power) coideal.
If, however, one wishes to achieve ‘cozero’ for an arbitrary inequality (for instance, if—as we did in [54]—one
decides to require S ⊂∼ {0} rather than S ⊂ ¬{0} from every coideal), then one needs to add ‘cozero’ to the
rules for simultaneous generation. As Jesper Carlström kindly pointed out to us, the drawbacks of this move are
that one must modify the technique of simultaneous generation, and that it produces a covering and a positivity
relation which are possibly wider and narrower, respectively, than  and .
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6.2. The derived predicate
We define the predicate Pos attached to a commutative ring A by setting
Pos(a) ⇐⇒ a  A
for a ∈ A, so that
P (A) = {a ∈ A : Pos(a)}.
The compatibility of  automatically yields that Pos is monotone.
We now assume—for the rest of Section 6—that = be the denial inequality on the
commutative ring A under consideration. Since then Pos0(a) coincides with ¬ (a  ∅),
we have
Pos(a) =⇒ Pos0(a)
for every a ∈ A by the monotonicity of Pos; more generally,
C(A) ⊂ C0 (A)
∪ ∪
P(A) ⊂ P0 (A)
(22)
where
C0 (A) = {a ∈ A : a = 0} , P0 (A) = {a ∈ A : Pos0(a)}.
In particular, every coideal (respectively, every power coideal) lies inside C0 (A)
(respectively, inside P0 (A)).
By definition, C (A) = C0 (A) if and only if C0 (A) is a coideal, and P (A) = P0 (A)
if and only if P0 (A) is a power coideal. Since = is a ring inequality, the additive property
of a coideal is the only missing condition for C0 (A) to be a coideal and for P0 (A) to be a
power coideal, which in the case of C0 (A) amounts to = being cotransitive.
Moreover, P0 (A) = C0 (A) precisely when A is reduced. So if A is reduced and =
is cotransitive, then P0 (A) is a power coideal and thus P(A) = P0 (A); whence all the
subsets in (22) are equal.
Since Pos is monotone, it coincides with Pos0 only if the latter is also monotone.
According to the coinductive generation of , this necessary condition is also a sufficient
one: Pos is the widest monotone predicate on A with P(A) ⊂ C0 (A). Lemma 5 provides
the only missing link in the following result.
Proposition 22. Let A be a commutative ring with the denial inequality =. Then the
following items are equivalent:
1. Pos0 is monotone.
2. P0 (A) is a power coideal.
3. P (A) = P0 (A).
4. Pos coincides with Pos0.
In view of Propositions 7 and 10, we also have the following.
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Corollary 23. If A is quasireduced and the denial inequality = is cotransitive, then Pos
coincides with Pos0.
Corollary 24. LLPO is equivalent to Pos coinciding with Pos0 for every discrete
commutative ring.
The next result indicates that, constructively, the openness of Pos is not always a
desideratum.
Corollary 25. LPO follows from the statement that Pos is open for every discrete
commutative ring A.
Proof. Let A = D be the discrete ring given in the proof of Proposition 8. As
Pos0 is monotone for this ring (see the proof of Corollary 9), it coincides with Pos
(Proposition 22). So if Pos is open, then so is Pos0, and Proposition 14 applies. 
In particular, if the derived positivity predicate Pos is open for every basic formal
topology with a Stone covering, then LPO holds. So one has to be careful with ‘forcing’
openness as proposed in [49], by ‘adding it at will’ to the properties of such a Pos: that
is, by deliberately adjoining this condition to the other ones. We refer to Proposition 15
and Proposition 16 for how to relate WLPO and MP in an analogous way to ‘proofs by
cases’ and ‘ex falso quodlibet’, respectively, for Pos.
For all this, we believe to have made a good choice of the positivity relation  and the
interior operator P for the formal Zariski topology of a commutative ring A.
7. Are there enough points?
The notion of a formal point, with which a formal topology—as every truly point-free
setting—can only be decorated afterwards, is guided by the intuition that a formal point
consists of the indices of the basic open sets which belong to a neighbourhood filter of an
imagined concrete point. Unlike the case of ordinary topological spaces, formal points are
by no means constitutive for formal topologies, for which those indices, the basic opens,
are the primitive objects.
Given a formal topology with underlying set A and covering relation , a formal point
is a subset ξ of A with the following properties: first, ξ is inhabited; secondly, ξ satisfies
a ∈ ξ ∧ b ∈ ξ =⇒ ξ  a ↓ b (23)
for all a, b ∈ A; thirdly, ξ is monotone in the sense that
a ∈ ξ ∧ a U =⇒ ξ  U (24)
for all a ∈ A and U ⊂ A. We have already encountered the latter condition in the case of
the positivity predicate.33
33 It is because of the different intuitions connected with a formal point and a positivity predicate that one
speaks of the former as a subset and of the latter as a predicate, although subsets can—and perhaps should—be
understood as in type-theoretic contexts [52]: as predicates on the ambient set.
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On the level of the frame Sat (A) of formal opens, a formal point is nothing but a
completely prime filter [47].34 As the latter is an adequate notion of a point in the theory
of locales, the observations recalled in the following paragraph (for which we refer to [28,
II.1.3–7]) are completely analogous to the corresponding ones for locales, but likewise
require some impredicative reasoning.
The collection Pt (A) of formal points can be endowed with the extensional topology of
which
{ξ ∈ Pt (A) : ξ ∈ a} (a ∈ A)
is a basis of open sets, and with which Pt (A) is a sober topological space. If A itself is a
basis of open sets of an already given topological space X , then the canonical continuous
mapping
X → Pt (A) , x → {a ∈ A : x ∈ a}
is a homeomorphism precisely when X is sober.
When A comes with a monoid structure as in [47], then (23) is given its stronger form
a ∈ ξ ∧ b ∈ ξ =⇒ ab ∈ ξ (25)
for all a ∈ A and U ⊂ A, and every monotone ξ is inhabited if and only if 1 ∈ ξ . In
particular, ξ being a multiplicative subset is part of the definition of ξ being a formal point.
In the presence of a positivity predicate pos on A, a formal point ξ is required to satisfy
the additional condition
a ∈ ξ =⇒ pos(a) (26)
for all a ∈ A. The intuition standing behind (26) is that if a represents a basic open set
contained in a neighbourhood filter—the one represented by ξ—of a certain point, then a
is inhabited by this point. Note that (26) is a consequence of (24)) whenever pos is open
and monotone [41].
In the case of a basic formal topology with positivity relation , one even expects every
formal point ξ to fulfil the condition dual to ξ being monotone [51]: that is,
a ∈ ξ ∧ ξ ⊂ U =⇒ a  U (27)
for all a ∈ A and U ⊂ A. When one steps back from a binary positivity  to the unary one
with Pos(a) as a  A , then (27) collapses to (26) for Pos.
A formal topology is said to be spatial or to have enough points if there are sufficiently
many formal points to recover the covering [47,21,18]: that is,
∀ξ (a ∈ ξ ⇒ ξ  U) =⇒ a U (28)
for all a ∈ A and U ⊂ A. Here ξ varies over the formal points whose defining properties
depend on the context, and thus always need to be specified. Note that the converse of (28)
34 Although the notions of (prime) filter and (prime) ideal in a lattice are analogous to their ring-theoretic
forerunners, we do not to explain the latter, which—as lattice-theoretic concepts in general—are somewhat
secondary to the present setting. We refer instead to [28, I.2.1–2].
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is nothing but (24): the latter says that if a  U and ξ is a formal point with a ∈ ξ , then
ξ  U .
As an instance of a universal quantification over subsets, even over point-like items, (28)
causes doubts from a predicative perspective. It actually is a relatively strong principle, as
the following adaptation of ‘every spatial locale is open’ [29, p. 99] shows.
Proposition 26. If a formal topology has enough points satisfying (26) for an arbitrary
predicate pos of basic opens, then pos is open.
Proof. We verify positivity for pos. To this end, let a ∈ A and U ⊂ A, and assume that
pos (a) ⇒ a  U . If ξ is a formal point satisfying (26), then a ∈ ξ implies a  U by
our assumption. Hence, for any such ξ , if a ∈ ξ , then ξ  U by (24). In other words, the
antecedent of (28) holds, so that a U . 
In this result, pos neither has to be open, which it a posteriori is, nor monotone. There
is furthermore no need to assume that formal points satisfy (23) or even (25), let alone that
a monoid structure is given on A.
We now return to the formal Zariski topology of a commutative ring A. Its formal
points have a neat algebraic characterisation, which coincides with the one given in locale
theory [28, V.3.2]. All this is little surprising when one takes into account that the points
of the concrete topological space Spec (A) are the prime ideals of A whose complements
are—classically—the prime filters of A.
Proposition 27. Let A be a commutative ring. The formal points of the formal Zariski
topology of A are precisely the prime filters of A. More specifically, the following items are
equivalent for each subset ξ of A:
1. ξ is a prime filter.
2. 1 ∈ ξ , and ξ satisfies (24) and (25).
3. 1 ∈ ξ , and ξ satisfies (24), (25), and (27).
4. 1 ∈ ξ , and ξ satisfies (24), (25), and (26) with Pos (a) in place of pos (a).
5. 1 ∈ ξ , and ξ satisfies (24), (25), and (26) with ¬ (a  ∅) in place of pos (a).
6. 1 ∈ ξ , and ξ satisfies (24), (25), and (26) with ¬ (a = 0) in place of pos (a).
Proof. Notice first that ξ is a multiplicative subset precisely when it contains 1 and enjoys
property (25). Secondly, condition (24) amounts to a ∈ ξ being a monotone property of
a, which by Lemma 5 is equivalent to ξ being a power coideal. Since a prime filter is a
(power) coideal that, in addition, is a multiplicative subset, the first and the second item
are equivalent. Similarly, if ξ is a prime filter, then ξ is a power coideal, so that (27) is
fulfilled according to the definition of . Observe next that (27) implies (26) for Pos (a),
and thus also for ¬ (a  ∅), since the latter predicate contains the former. Clearly, the fifth
item implies the sixth, which in turn implies the second. 
Since the Zariski frame of A, the frame of radical ideals of A, is perfectly coherent,
every prime filter in this frame is complete a priori; moreover, the Zariski frame is nothing
but the frame Sat (A) of formal opens of the formal Zariski topology of A. Proposition 27
therefore implies that the prime filters of A as a ring are precisely the prime filters of
the Zariski frame of A. Like the analogous fact for prime ideals [14], this observation
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elucidates once more the close relation between the ring structure of A and its lattice-
theoretic counterpart.
Moreover, the classical Zariski spectrum Spec (A) is a sober topological space; whence
the canonical mapping Spec (A) → Pt (A) is a homeomorphism. It maps each prime ideal
p to its complement A \ p, for the latter equals {a ∈ A : p ∈ D (a)}.
In view of Propositions 26 and 27, we cannot expect a constructive proof that the formal
Zariski topology has enough points: this is too strong an assumption even for discrete rings
(see Proposition 14 or Corollary 25).
Corollary 28. LPO follows from the assumption that, for every discrete commutative ring
A, the formal Zariski topology of A has enough points.
As in the case of Proposition 14, to arrive at LPO it suffices to assume ‘enough points’
for the ring D of the proof of Proposition 8, and thus for every discrete ring of the form
Z[t]. In view of Proposition 27, we can state Corollary 28 as it stands, without specifying
which—if any—of the available concepts of positivity enters the definition of a formal
point. (This equally holds for Pos0 (a), since it is equivalent to ¬ (a  ∅) whenever = is
the denial inequality.) In other words, the choice of a notion of positivity is completely
irrelevant for the constructive lack of points for the formal Zariski topology.
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